Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, October Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12 by Sullivan, Barry & Canty, Megan
Utah Law Review 
Volume 2015 Number 5 Article 2 
2015 
Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: Oral Argument in the 
Supreme Court, October Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12 
Barry Sullivan 
Megan Canty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sullivan, Barry and Canty, Megan (2015) "Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: Oral Argument in the 
Supreme Court, October Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2015 : No. 5 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2015/iss5/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 




INTERRUPTIONS IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE: ORAL ARGUMENT  
IN THE SUPREME COURT, OCTOBER TERMS 1958–60 AND 2010–12 
 
Barry Sullivan* and Megan Canty** 
 
I think it would be an intellectual feast just to be there . . . .1 
 
[T]hey’re so prepared, they’re so smart, they’re so thorough, they’re so 
engaged, their questioning is rapid-fire. You’re really seeing an 
institution of government at work, I think, in a really admirable way.2 
 
The Justices joke and clown, interrupt each other, give the impression of 
playing to the crowd—and certainly seem to be having a good time.3 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last several decades, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
experienced many significant changes, both with respect to the Court’s internal 
                                                            
* © 2015 Barry Sullivan. Cooney & Conway Chair in Advocacy and Professor of Law, 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
** © 2015 Megan Canty. Assistant Director of the Dan K. Webb Center for Advocacy, 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The authors would like to thank Joseph 
Weishampel, who was principally responsible for compiling the empirical data contained in 
this Article; Conor Desmond, who assisted us with some of the statistical analysis; Jeffrey 
Gordon, Ghirlandi Guidetti, John Klinker, and David Lakin, who provided additional 
research assistance and helped prepare the Article for publication; and Julienne Grant, 
Loyola Reference Librarian, who provided additional research guidance. We are also grateful 
to Mary Ellen Becker, Robert P. Burns, Erwin Chemerinsky, Zelda Harris, Alfred S. 
Konefsky, H. Jefferson Powell, Zoë Robinson, Matthew Sag, Jay Tidmarsh, Winnifred 
Fallers Sullivan, and Michael Zimmer, as well as participants in a faculty seminar at the 
School of Law at Trinity College Dublin, for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The 
authors are also grateful to Marcia Coyle, who generously responded to a question we raised. 
Some of the work on this Article was accomplished while Professor Sullivan was Arthur Cox 
Visiting Research Fellow and Visiting Professor at Trinity College Dublin. He would like to 
thank Arthur Cox and Trinity College, as well as the Loyola Faculty Research Fund and the 
Cooney & Conway Chair Fund, for their support.  
1 Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 854 (1987) 
(testimony of Judge Robert H. Bork). 
2 The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 83 (2010) 
[hereinafter Kagan Confirmation Hearing] (testimony of Solicitor General Elena Kagan). 
3 LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 314 
(2013). 
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practices and in the larger context within which the Court does its work: Congress 
has virtually eliminated the Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction,4 while the 
Court itself has drastically reduced the size of its discretionary review docket, 
thereby producing a merits caseload about half the size that it was in the 1980s;5 the 
lower federal courts have experienced a significant increase in filings and 
dispositions, and Congress has authorized many additional judgeships to 
accommodate that growth;6 Congress has doubled the authorized complement of 
Supreme Court law clerks;7 the Court’s membership has become more diverse in 
                                                            
4 See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of 
Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 389, 39195 (2004) (detailing the gradual erosion of mandatory jurisdiction through 
legislation from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, culminating in the 
enactment of Supreme Court Case Selections Act, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988), 
which gave the Court virtually complete (albeit not total) control over its docket). 
5 See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the 
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 950 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. PEPPERS, 
COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 
100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006)) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court’s plenary docket has plunged over the last two decades, from 153 signed 
opinions in 1986 to a comparably paltry seventy-four signed opinions in 2002 and 2003.”) 
(citation omitted). The Court’s output has remained at about that level. See Opinions, 
SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/14 (last 
visited May 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GVY5-4DRU. As recently as the 1980s, 
the Supreme Court’s caseload was generally regarded as overwhelming. See, e.g., David M. 
O’Brien, Managing the Business of the Supreme Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 667, 667 
(1985) (“All of the justices now agree that they are overworked by deciding too many 
cases.”).  
6 See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 3738 (2013). Since 1960, the 
caseloads of the federal courts of appeals have grown elevenfold. Id. at 37. According to 
Judge Posner, “There has been a parallel increase in the number of cases in the district courts, 
but the increase in the courts of appeals has been larger in percentage terms because the 
appeal rate has risen.” Id. The number of authorized judgeships has increased 177% at the 
district court level, from 241 to 667, and 163% at the court of appeals level, from sixty-eight 
to 179. Id. at 38. Congress has also sought to relieve the burden on judges by increasing the 
number of lower-court clerkships and providing for staff attorneys. See infra note 7. 
7 See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 5, at 45. Congress increased the number of 
authorized law clerks from two to three in 1970 and from three to four in 1974. Id. 
Significantly, Congress also has increased the number of lower-court clerkships. In 1960, a 
federal court of appeals judge could employ two law clerks, while a federal district judge 
was authorized to have one law clerk. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 139 (1999). Today, federal appellate judges may hire up to five 
clerks if they forego employment of a judicial assistant or secretary, while district judges 
may hire up to three. Inside the Federal Courts, Who Does What, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe!openform&nav=menu1&page=/federal/co
urts.nsf/page/352 (last visited June 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8CSK-PXLU. 
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some respects, such as gender, but less so in others, with all of the current Justices 
having graduated from Harvard or Yale, and a plurality having been law professors 
at elite institutions;8 the Court has reduced by half the time allotted for oral 
argument;9 the Court’s post-argument conference reportedly has become shorter and 
more perfunctory;10 the Court’s opinions have increased in length;11 the exchanges 
in the Justices’ opinions are often more tendentious;12 and the Justices seem to savor 
                                                            
Additional resources have been provided to appellate judges through the development of 
“staff attorney” offices. See id.  
8 See Weekend Edition Sunday: The Harvard-Yalification of the Supreme Court, NPR 
(May 16, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12680 
2460 [hereinafter Weekend Edition Sunday]. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia 
were all full-time law professors earlier in their careers. See Biographies of Current Justices 
of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
biographies.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CG6S-YUFE. In 
addition, Justice Kennedy taught constitutional law at the McGeorge School of Law from 
1965 to 1988. See id. Some observers have also commented on a shift in religious affiliations. 
Whereas most Justices of the past were Protestants, the Court is now composed entirely of 
Roman Catholics and Jews. Indeed, six of the twelve Catholics ever to have served on the 
Court are currently serving. Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court May Soon Lack Protestant 
Justices, Morning Edition, NPR (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyID=125641988; Sarah Posner, Does the Supreme Court’s Religious Composition 
Matter?, RELIGION DISPATCHES, (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://www.religiondispatches. 
org/does-the-supreme-courts-religious-composition-matter/, archived at http://perma.cc/M5 
S6-7JUF.  
9 See infra note 121. 
10 See RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON & JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL ARGUMENTS 
AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE 13 
(2012). 
11 See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length 
of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 630, 634–35 (2008). In the 1950s, 
the median length of Supreme Court opinions was about 2,000 words. Id. at 634. In October 
Term 2009, the median length was 8,265 words. See Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on 
Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L6E2-
KZJ4.  
12 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 
22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 386, 399400 (2000) (expressing concern about one justice’s 
rhetoric and the example it sets for law students and lawyers as to what counts for acceptable 
advocacy); Linda Greenhouse, Name-Calling in the Supreme Court: When the Justices Vent 
Their Spleen, Is There a Social Cost?, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1989/07/28/us/law-bar-name-calling-supreme-court-when-justices-vent-their-spleen-there-
social.html?smid=pl-share, archived at http://perma.cc/TGQ4-CS22; Tony Mauro, Supreme 
Court Justices Need to Regain Civility, USA TODAY (May 14, 1991); Jeffrey Rosen, 
Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.Feb. 2007, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P8CY-KUG8. But see David A. Yalof et al., Collegiality on the U.S. Supreme 
Court: An Early Assessment of the Roberts Court, 94 JUDICATURE 12 (2011).  
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a degree of public celebrity that was shunned by even their recent predecessors.13 
Even the confirmation process has changed in recent years.14 
Yet another significant change was noted by then-Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., 
in 2004. Speaking to the Supreme Court Historical Society, shortly before his 
appointment as the nation’s seventeenth Chief Justice, he observed that one of the 
most significant changes during his professional lifetime had been the increased 
                                                            
13 RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE 
MEDIA 2728 (2011). But one commentator has observed that the Justices seem to be 
selective in choosing their venues and seem to prefer appearing before friendly audiences. 
See Adam Liptak, Justices Get Out More, But Calendars Aren’t Open to Just Anyone, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/us/politics/justices-get-out-
more-but-calendars-arent-open-to-just-anyone.html?hpw&rref=politics&action=click&pg 
type=Homepage&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well&_r=0 
(“Tracking the public appearances of the justices is surprisingly hard. They are public 
officials and public figures, and they seem to like the acclaim and influence that come from 
appearances before friendly audiences. But many of them appear wary of more general 
public scrutiny.”). That commentator has also noted that, “As the court’s workload has 
dropped, the justices have found time for more outside appearances.” Id. 
14 The confirmation process has become more protracted, and perhaps more adversarial 
on average, in recent years. It is unimaginable, for example, that a Justice could be confirmed 
today after a Senate hearing that lasted only ninety minutes—including only eleven minutes 
of testimony by the nominee—as was the case with Justice Byron White in 1962. DENNIS J. 
HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON 
R. WHITE 330–31 (1998). Observers may disagree about the extent to which the confirmation 
process has become more contentious, or when the change, if any, occurred, but President 
Lyndon Johnson’s attempted elevation of Justice Abe Fortas to the Chief Justiceship, and the 
subsequent nominations by President Richard Nixon of Judge Clement Haynsworth, Jr., and 
Judge G. Harrold Carswell, may have marked a turning point in the modern period. Paul A. 
Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 
1155–56 (1988); see RICHARD HARRIS, DECISION 25–35 (1971) (detailing the history of the 
Carswell nomination); see generally Elena Kagan, Review: Confirmation Messes, Old and 
New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (1995) (book review) (discussing the “brutalization and 
the politicization of the [confirmation] process”); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation 
Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1203 (1988) (explaining that “the 
Senate’s role in the appointment of Supreme Court judges is properly viewed as largely 
‘political’”). The process certainly became more bare-knuckled with the nominations of 
Judge Robert Bork and Judge Clarence Thomas. See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Robert 
Bork’s America, 133 Cong. Rec. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (floor statement of Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy on the nomination of Robert Bork); ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR 
JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 191 (1st ed. 1989) (explaining that 
Bork’s strong association with the right had to be played down); CLARENCE THOMAS, MY 
GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 217 (2007) (“All I knew was that I was about to face a 
battle far worse than anything I’d ever before experienced. ‘You know that some of my 
opponents are going to try to kill me,’ I told Virginia as we drove home from Andrews Air 
Force Base.”). From the very beginning of our history, however, many nominations have 
failed through inaction, withdrawal, or Senate rejection. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE 
THIS HONORABLE COURT 142–51 (1985).  
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“professionalization” of Supreme Court advocates and the “re-emergence of a 
Supreme Court Bar.”15 The Chief Justice thus described the recent ascendancy of a 
small cadre of lawyers who regularly appear before the Justices,16 not unlike the 
Supreme Court bar of the early nineteenth century when a large number of cases was 
argued by a small group of lawyers—including such luminaries as William Pinkney, 
Thomas A. Emmet, Daniel Webster, William Wirt, and Horace Binney.17 Although 
Chief Justice Roberts recognized that the desirability of this development might be 
questioned by some as yet another indication of the triumph of elitism at the Court 
                                                            
15 John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 
30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 68 (2005) (“Over the past generation, roughly the period since 1980, 
there has been a discernible professionalization among the advocates before the Supreme 
Court, to the extent that one can speak of the emergence of a real Supreme Court bar.”); see 
also Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490 (2008) 
(explaining that “what has gone wholly unrecognized by all, including legal scholars, is how 
the re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar of elite attorneys similar to the early-nineteenth-
century Bar in its domination of Supreme Court advocacy is quietly transforming the Court 
and the nation’s laws”).  
16 Most observers would have included the Chief Justice in that group prior to his 
appointment to the bench. MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE 
ROBERTS COURT 63 (2013) (“John Roberts was a leading member of the new Supreme Court 
bar.”). 
17 MAURICE G. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE SUPREME COURT 1735 (1966). 
As recently as 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that “[t]here is no such Supreme Court 
bar at the present time.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 249 (1987). 
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and in the nation,18 he found it a salutary development because of what he took to 
be the improved quality of advocacy that accompanied it.19 
                                                            
18 Roberts, supra note 15, at 79. As Chief Justice Roberts noted, “the re-emergence of 
a Supreme Court bar” means that more cases originating around the country will be briefed 
and argued by Washington lawyers. Id. at 68. In addition, since the Court grants certiorari 
far less often than it did a generation ago, oral argument actually occurs in far fewer cases. 
Because even the most distinguished Supreme Court advocates need to demonstrate to 
paying clients that they have a continuous presence at the Court, many “chase” cases in which 
certiorari has been granted or seems likely to be granted. These advocates often volunteer to 
brief a case for free, provided that they present the oral argument. Adam Liptak, Specialists’ 
Help at Court Can Come with a Catch, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/us/10lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, (on file 
with the Utah Law Review). The perceived need to maintain one’s image as a “player” may 
also provide part of the explanation for the proliferation of amicus curiae briefs. See Joseph 
D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme 
Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 770 (2000) (detailing the rise of amicus briefs since World 
War II). Of course, the Court itself has become more “elite,” with all of the current Justices 
having graduated from Harvard or Yale. Weekend Edition Sunday, supra note 8. Moreover, 
the United States is a far different country today than it was in the days of the early Republic. 
In what might be called the Age of Webster, the United States had a relatively homogeneous 
population numbering fewer than ten million people (a number that included slaves and 
others barred from full participation in civic life), 1820 Census, CENSUS RECORDS, 
https://www.censusrecords.com/content/1820_Census, archived at http://perma.cc/92P7-
Q2HW; transportation and communication were difficult; and the whole country had only 
about 6,000 lawyers of widely divergent ability and training. Intelligence, 2 AM. JURIST & 
L. MAG. 400, 400 (1829). An elite Supreme Court bar might have seemed desirable in that 
context, but circumstances are far different today, when the United States boasts a diverse 
population numbering more than 320 million, U.S. and World Population Clock, UNITED 
STATES CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://www.census.gov/popclock/, 
sophisticated transportation networks allowing for the rapid and efficient movement of 
people and goods, diverse communication networks permitting instantaneous 
communication across the nation and the world, and immense human capital, including 1.3 
million of the world’s most highly educated lawyers. Lawyer Demographics, A.B.A. (2014), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research 
/lawyer-demographics-tables-2014.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T8T9-
YWEH.  
19 A recent empirical study has focused additional attention on this issue by suggesting 
that a small group of lawyers may well dominate the Court’s work to an even greater extent 
than previously supposed. Joan Biskupic et al., Special Report: At U.S. Court of Last Resort, 
Handful of Lawyers Dominate Docket, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014, 6:01 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/08/us-scotus-elites-special-report-idUSKBN0JM0 
ZX20141208?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9GKA-WKRJ. Some commentators have expressed concern 
about this concentration of influence. E.g., The Editorial Board, The Best Lawyers Money 
Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/opinion/the-
best-lawyers-money-can-buy.html. On the other hand, Justice Kagan has recently suggested 
that more criminal defense lawyers should turn over more of their cases to members of this 
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In Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the Justices know what they want from 
advocacy in general—and from oral argument in particular—and seasoned Supreme 
Court practitioners are most likely to give it to them. Traditionally, oral argument 
has been valued for several reasons. Oral argument has been thought important as a 
way to assist the Justices in reaching a fully informed decision; to provide counsel 
with the opportunity to make his or her best case directly to the Justices; to assure 
the parties to the litigation that their concerns have been fully heard and fairly 
considered by those with the power to decide; and, not insignificantly, to provide 
the public with an understanding not only of what is at stake in a particular case, but 
also of the process by which the case law that binds us all is made.20 All of those 
purposes seem essential to an institution whose function is not simply to announce 
legal principles, but also to decide real cases and controversies. Indeed, the Court’s 
duty to decide real disputes is the only source of its authority to announce legal 
principles.21 In general, however, what seasoned Supreme Court practitioners bring 
to the table—and what is particularly valued by clients, especially when the Court 
                                                            
elite group, thus signaling her belief than an even greater concentration of Supreme Court 
advocacy would be desirable. Tony Mauro, Kagan Dishes on Supreme Court Bar, State of 
the Union and Law Schools, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/ 
id=1202716979048/Kagan-Dishes-on-Supreme-Court-Bar-State-of-the-Union-and-Law-
Schools?slreturn=20150517222930, archived at http://perma.cc/3FLU-3A7E. The idea of an 
elite bar is no doubt psychologically satisfying to those involved. 
20 See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge 
to the Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (1986) (noting that “[a] principal 
justification for oral argument . . . is that the governmental processes should, to the extent 
possible, be conducted in public, to assure the public and the participants in the process that 
decisions are based on publicly acknowledged considerations and interests”). That purpose 
is particularly important in a constitutional system that looks to the courts to “say what the 
law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Indeed, given the place of 
judicial review in our constitutional system, transparency in constitutional interpretation is 
as important to citizens as the accessibility of the constitutional text. See McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“A constitution, to contain an accurate detail 
of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which 
they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could 
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the 
public.”). 
21 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2699 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[D]eclaring the compatibility of state or federal laws with the Constitution is not only not 
the ‘primary role’ of this Court, it is not a separate, free-standing role at all. We perform that 
role incidentally—by accident, as it were—when that is necessary to resolve the dispute 
before us. Then, and only then, does it become ‘the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.’”); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established 
practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress 
unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question 
is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.”) (quoting Blair v. United States, 
250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919)). 
1012 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
is deeply divided, with one or two so-called “swing” Justices—is an intimate 
understanding of each Justice’s predilections and a sense of the precise argument 
that is needed to secure an individual Justice’s vote without losing those of the 
others.22 In some sense, that may well count as an improvement in the quality of 
advocacy, but it also raises larger questions about the nature of advocacy and the 
reality of judicial decision-making.23 
Exactly what the Justices want from oral argument may be somewhat unclear. 
For Justice Kagan, it seems to be the frisson of “rapid-fire” questioning.24 On the 
other hand, Justice Thomas would like to hear a coherent presentation by counsel 
without unnecessary interruptions by his colleagues.25 Others seem to relish the 
opportunity for public exposure and the promise of “a good time” or perhaps having 
the opportunity to demonstrate their own cleverness or erudition, not infrequently at 
the expense of counsel.26  
Whatever the Justices may or may not want from oral argument, it is not 
immediately clear that the conditions necessary for the satisfaction of those desires 
necessarily correspond with the conditions required to ensure that the parties be 
afforded a full and fair hearing, let alone that the Court reach the best possible 
decision. Nor is it necessarily clear that what the Justices want has much to do with 
promoting the transparency and other qualities that might be thought indispensable 
to the Court’s legitimacy, given the vast, unreviewable power that this unelected 
body exercises in our democratic society. Clearly, justice must not only be done, but 
be seen to be done, and both sides must be afforded an equal hearing before a tribunal 
that is impartial both in fact and in appearance.27 It also seems clear that litigants and 
                                                            
22 See Michael Zimmer, The Employer’s Strategy in Gross v. FBL Financials, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/ 
11/the-employers-strategy-in-gross-v-fbl-financials.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HT9A 
-CKEX (detailing late-in-the-game, winning strategy decision made when seasoned Supreme 
Court advocate joined employer’s legal team). 
23 See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL 
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 39 (2008) (explaining the constraints that guide judicial 
decision-making and the courts’ need to abide by those constraints). 
24 Kagan Confirmation Hearing, supra note 2, at 83. 
25 Ilya Somin, Observing Clarence Thomas at Oral Argument, WASH. POST, (Feb. 25, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/25/observing 
-clarence-thomas-at-oral-argument/, archived at http://perma.cc/XR2A-55V5 (“Thomas has 
a reasonable counterargument when he suggests that the justices would do better to listen to 
the arguments of counsel rather than take up much of [the] time . . . with their own points.”). 
26 EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 314.  
27 As Stuart Hampshire has observed, “No one is expected to believe that [the Court’s] 
decisions are infallibly just in matters of substance; but everybody is expected to believe that 
at least its procedures are just because they conform to the basic principle governing 
adversary reasoning: that both sides should be equally heard.” STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE 
IS CONFLICT 95 (2000). Professor Hampshire has further noted that equality of hearing is the 
essential hallmark of proceedings that are distinctively judicial: “In parliaments, councils, 
and governmental bodies of all kinds, the two elements of procedural justice are differently 
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their concerns should be treated seriously and with respect. The excellence of oral 
argument as an institution may therefore depend on something more than a particular 
kind of technical virtuosity.28 At the very least, a tension exists between the idea of 
a court that exists for the people and one whose proceedings are transparent in 
practice only to the cognoscenti. 
In his address to the Supreme Court Historical Society, Chief Justice Roberts 
also remarked on one aspect of Supreme Court practice that he thought not to have 
changed in recent years, namely, the “level of questioning” at oral argument. “Over 
the last generation,” he observed, “one thing that has remained fairly constant has 
been the level of questioning.”29 Comparing fourteen cases from October Term 1980 
                                                            
balanced. The requirement that both sides in the conflict should be equally heard always 
needs to be stressed because it is not obviously guaranteed, as it is in a court of law.” Id. at 
96. According to Professor Hampshire, the judicial procedures necessary for “the fair 
weighing and balancing of contrary arguments bearing on an unavoidable and disputable 
issue” are “all subject to the single prescription of audi alteram partem (‘hear the other 
side’).” Id. at 8. 
28 That is especially true if virtuosity is mainly defined as the ability to withstand “rapid-
fire” questioning. But technical virtuosity is not irrelevant: oral argument is rightly perceived 
as an art form. See, e.g., REBECCA WEST, THE MEANING OF TREASON 46 (Phoenix Press 
2000) (1949) (“There in the House of Lords [in the treason case of William Joyce] there was 
being given a performance far finer than the highest level of the proceedings in the Court of 
Appeal: as far superior to that, as that had been to the Old Bailey. When these four old Judges 
had a passage with counsel, it was as good as first-class tennis.”). Justice Blackmun actually 
graded the performance of advocates. See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 215 (2005) (discussing grades 
that Justice Blackmun gave his future colleague, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg). See also 
Timothy R. Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court: Does it 
Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457, 524–25 (2007) (finding a positive 
correlation, even controlling for other variables, between the perceived quality of an 
argument and the outcome in a case). 
29 Roberts, supra note 15, at 75. Although a substantial body of literature addresses 
“questioning” by Supreme Court Justices, comparing the data in the various studies is 
somewhat difficult because there appears to be little consensus as to what counts as a 
“question” or how the “number of questions” is to be calculated. For example, Chief Justice 
Roberts did not explain what, exactly, he took the term “question” to mean, or how precisely 
he counted them up, but the number of questions he reportsan average of eighty-seven per 
case in 1980 and ninety-one in 2003is lower than the numbers reported by others for 
similar periods, as noted below. The discrepancy may be related to the Chief Justice’s 
relatively small sample. Alternatively, it may suggest that he was using a more conservative 
definition of “question,” perhaps one that captured only true interrogatories and thereby 
excluded other utterances, statements, interjections, and interruptions. If so, the Chief Justice 
may have missed an important issue: whether counsel is being interrupted more frequently, 
in whatever form and for whatever reason, than was previously the case. It may also be that 
his lower total count could be attributable to having treated multiple questions (e.g., 
“QUESTION: ‘Do we know what the contemporaneous understanding of ‘cruel and unusual’ 
was? Are we bound by that? If not, why is that the case?’”) that occur within a “speaking 
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with fourteen cases from October Term 2003, the Chief Justice concluded that the 
average number of questions had increased only slightly—from eighty-seven per 
case in 1980 to ninety-one per case in 2003.30 The Chief Justice also observed, 
however, that his data confirmed what others had noted previously: the lawyer who 
faces the greater number of questions at oral argument is more likely to lose.31 
Recalling that John W. Davis, the great Supreme Court advocate,32 long ago 
counseled advocates to “rejoice” when the Court asks questions,33 the Chief Justice 
quipped that that advice might warrant reconsideration.34 
Chief Justice Roberts’s claim—that the “level of questioning” did not increase 
significantly between 1980 and 2003—seems surprising at first blush. Many 
knowledgeable (if somewhat casual) Court watchers have the opposite impression. 
One cannot read press accounts of recent Supreme Court arguments, let alone read 
or listen to the arguments themselves, without being impressed by the assertiveness 
                                                            
turn” (that is, any intervention by a Justice preceded and followed by an intervention by 
counsel or another Justice) as one question, whereas others might treat the same speaking 
turn as containing three questions. In addition, the Chief Justice did not consider whether the 
length of questions had changed between the two periods. On the other hand, the Chief 
Justice’s conclusion about the relatively constant “level of questioning” has been partially 
corroborated by Lee Epstein and her coauthors, who concluded that the number of questions 
per case increased only minimally between 1979 and 2007. See Lee Epstein et al., Inferring 
the Winning Party in the Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument, 
39 J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 442 (2010). However, those authors also found that the number of 
words per question had doubled during that period. Id. at 44243. Another study concluded 
that the number of questions per case changed significantly between 1978 and 1996. Timothy 
R. Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds Want to Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands with 
Questions at Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 
251–52 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds]. Timothy Johnson and his 
coauthors found that the Court asked about 120 questions per case in 1980, slightly more 
than eighty per case in 1985, and 147 per case in 1995. Id. at 252. Significantly, the Epstein 
study relied in part on the data compiled by the Johnson team, which “counted the number 
of times each Justice spoke during oral arguments.” Timothy R. Johnson et al., Pardon the 
Interruption: An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices’ Behavior During Oral 
Arguments, 55 LOY. L. REV. 331, 337 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Pardon the 
Interruption]. Thus, whereas Chief Justice Roberts may have compared only true 
interrogatories, Johnson (and Epstein) appear to have included all “speaking turns.” 
Johnson’s Inquiring Minds supports this inference. See Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds, at 
25051.  
30 Roberts, supra note 15, at 75. 
31 Id. 
32 See generally WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. 
DAVIS xv–xvi (1973) (discussing Davis’s prominence as an advocate). 
33 Roberts, supra note 15, at 75 (quoting John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 
26 A.B.A. J. 895, 897 (1940)). 
34 Roberts, supra note 15, at 75. 
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of the Justices.35 Indeed, even some of the Justices (including Chief Justice Roberts) 
have commented on the difficulty that lawyers face in making their points,36 and 
Justice Thomas has justified his own silence by pointing to the loquacity of his 
colleagues.37 Was it ever thus? No less a Court watcher than Judge Richard A. 
                                                            
35 In some cases, the Justices’ assertiveness is directed toward each other, with one 
Justice interrupting another or asking counsel a question before counsel can answer the last 
question posed by another Justice. Despite the popular perception that the Justices frequently 
interrupt each other, one study, which recorded an “interruption” whenever the utterance of 
one Justice immediately followed that of another, found that only 6% of Justice utterances 
were interruptions. Johnson et al., Pardon the Interruption, supra note 29, at 338. In addition, 
that study discerned no longitudinal change between 1998 and 2006, but found a strong 
correlation between interrupting and being interrupted, suggesting that “Justices who ‘dish 
it out’ to their colleagues must also be able to ‘take it.’” Id. at 34748. Finally, some data 
suggested at least the possibility that ideology plays a role in the Justices’ decisions to 
interrupt. Id. at 349. 
36 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Most Inquisitive Court? No Argument There, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2013, at A14 (“Over the summer, several [Justices] . . . acknowledged that things had 
gotten out of hand in their courtroom, with their barrage of questions sometimes leaving the 
lawyers arguing before them as bystanders in their own cases.”). Even the Chief Justice has 
suggested that the Justices may talk too much. See Andrew Cohen, The Chief Justice Wants 
the Supreme Court to Stop Talking So Much, ATLANTIC, July 1, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/the-chief-justice-wants-the-supreme-
court-to-stop-talking-so-much/277385/, archived at http://perma.cc/LTM6-EWTK (“The 
Chief Justice . . . in a rare but routine public event at the end of this tumultuous term, politely 
acknowledged Saturday that he believes he and his colleagues on the bench ask too many 
questions during oral argument. ‘It is too much,’ John Roberts told a friendly audience at the 
Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference held at the luxurious Greenbrier resort in West 
Virginia.”). 
37 E.g., Josh Gerstein, Clarence Thomas Defends Silence in Supreme Court Health Care 
Arguments, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-
radar/2012/04/clarence-thomas-defends-silence-in-supreme-court-health-119823.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9ZY2-X5Y6 (“Thomas suggested that by repeatedly interrupting 
lawyers his colleagues are depriving advocates of their chance to make their best case. ‘We 
have a lifetime to go back in chambers and to argue with each other,’ he said. ‘They have 30, 
40 minutes per side for cases that are important to them and to the country. They should 
argue. That’s a part of the process. . . . I don’t like to badger people. These are not children. 
The court traditionally did not do that. I have been there 20 years. I see no need for all of 
that. Most of that is in the briefs, and there are a few questions around the edges.’”). See also 
Jeffrey Toobin, Clarence Thomas’s Disgraceful Silence, NEW YORKER, Feb. 21, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/clarence-thomass-disgraceful-silence, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Z4A3-FETP (“But the process works only if the Justices engage. 
The current Supreme Court is almost too ready to do so, and sometimes lawyers have a hard 
time getting a word in edgewise . . . . Thomas has said [at law schools] that his colleagues 
talk too much, that he wants to let the lawyers say their piece, and that the briefs tell him all 
he needs to know. But this—as his colleagues’ ability to provoke revealing exchanges 
demonstrates—is nonsense. Thomas is simply not doing his job.”). Of course, Justice 
Thomas has also said that he regularly prepares an “outline form of the disposition” before 
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Posner has noted that the Justices are far more assertive at oral argument today than 
they were when he regularly observed the Court as a law clerk and Justice 
Department lawyer in the 1960s—about fifteen years before the start date of the 
Chief Justice’s study.38 
These somewhat conflicting observations suggest the need for further inquiry. 
If, for example, we take the Chief Justice’s point to be the more general one that oral 
argument has not changed much in the recent past, it might be useful not only to 
look at a data set somewhat larger than the Chief Justice’s twenty-eight cases, but to 
go back a little further in time than 1980, since many significant changes affecting 
the Court and its work had already occurred by that date.39 It might also be useful to 
look not just at “the level of questioning” (by whatever metric we might measure 
that), but at other aspects of oral argument. For example, since the Justices (like all 
judges) necessarily stand in a significant power relationship with respect to the 
lawyers who appear before them, it might be interesting to know, given the arguably 
coarser and less dignified quality of our present public life, whether the Justices’ 
treatment of lawyers at oral argument has changed since the time of the Warren 
Court.40 Has there been a change in the Justices’ understanding of what is required 
                                                            
hearing oral argument. MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
CONSTITUTION 105 (2013).  
38 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 2123. Judge Posner clerked for Justice Brennan in 
October Term 1962 and worked as an Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States 
from 1965 to 1967. Id. Judge Posner has argued that judges “should be aggressive at oral 
argument” and that “tendentious questioning . . . is an important method of communication 
with the other judges on the panel.” See POSNER, supra note 6, at 129. 
39 See, e.g., Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. 
L. REV. 777, 782–84 (1981) (describing pre-1980 changes in the administration of justice in 
the federal courts). 
40 Other aspects of the judiciary’s attitudes toward members of the bar—and the role of 
the judiciary—also may have changed. For example, Judge Charles E. Wyzanski wrote with 
apparent admiration that Judge Augustus Hand’s intended audience for his opinions was “not 
the bench, bar, or university world in general, but the particular lawyer who was about to 
lose the case and the particular trial judge whose judgment was being reviewed and perhaps 
reversed.” CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR., WHEREAS—A JUDGE’S PREMISES: ESSAYS IN 
JUDGMENT, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 71 (1965). Justice Brandeis had a somewhat broader 
view; he frequently alluded to the Court’s teaching role and argued that the Court has a duty 
to speak directly to the people. SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND 
BRANDEIS: A STUDY IN THE INFLUENCE OF IDEAS 295 (1956) (“‘We are teachers,’ Brandeis 
would occasionally say to his colleagues. He was apparently quite serious in urging that the 
Tribunal had a responsibility to teach and uphold moral principles.”). That was consistent, 
of course, with Justice Brandeis’s oft-stated assertion “that the highest office a person could 
aspire to in a democracy was that of citizen,” and that citizenship carried with it the 
responsibility to be informed and to act in an informed way. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 23839, 40001 (2009). See also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND 
MASKS OF THE LAW 1213 (1976) (discussing John Austin’s failure to grasp the teaching 
function of law); Barry Sullivan, The Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and the Uses of History, 
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for realizing the parties’ interest in having their case fully and fairly heard? Does the 
current approach to oral argument signify an increased tendency on the part of the 
Justices to treat the issues presented in cases as interesting intellectual puzzles, rather 
than real-life problems that are important to the parties and the public?41 Does the 
Justices’ penchant for “rapid-fire” questioning and for interrupting counsel and each 
other really constitute the most effective form of reasoned inquiry or best promote 
reasoned decision-making? Is it a reflection of professionalization or self-
indulgence? Likewise, does the Court’s current approach to oral argument signify 
any change in the Court’s understanding of its relationship to the public or of oral 
argument as a public event—not simply in the sense that it is formally open to 
citizens, but in the additional sense of affording citizens a real opportunity to learn 
what a dispute involves and how the Court’s resolution of that dispute might affect 
individual rights or the operation of government? For example, does the Court’s 
current approach, whereby the Justices usually seize center stage from the outset, 
without allowing counsel to sketch even the skeleton of a narrative,42 truly satisfy 
this objective? More broadly, is the Court’s apparent preference for a particular kind 
of technical virtuosity, even to the exclusion of public accessibility, really consistent 
with the Court’s role in our democratic society? Is it appropriate, notwithstanding 
the admitted complexity of modern legal issues, that citizens should be required to 
witness a Supreme Court argument in the same way that they might witness brain 
surgery, that is, with little understanding except for the recognition that experts 
appear to be at work? A proceeding may be open to the public, but lacking in real 
transparency; that is not an insignificant point, since oral argument is an important 
part—and necessarily the most transparent part—of the adjudicatory process43 
                                                            
60 TUL. L. REV. 314, 325, 340 (1985) (arguing that Judge Wisdom’s landmark civil rights 
opinions were meant to speak to the citizens whose lives were affected by them). 
41 Judge Noonan long ago caused us to focus on the relative invisibility of individuals 
in our legal process and tradition. See NOONAN, supra note 40, at 6. “Yet to regard law only 
as a game is to forget that in the process human opportunities and liberties and life itself may 
be taken.” Id. at 14. Even great judges sometimes tend to undervalue the interests and 
concerns of litigants, while overvaluing the significance of their own work. See BENJAMIN 
N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921) (“[A]s a system of case law 
develops, the sordid controversies of litigants are the stuff out of which great and shining 
truths will ultimately be shaped.”). The tendency to disembody litigants may be related to 
the process of professional socialization that begins in law school. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, 
THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 22 (2007) (“If 
students entering the medical profession must endure a breaking down of everyday beliefs 
about the body, physicality, and death, students entering the legal profession undergo a 
linguistic rupture, a change in how they view and use language.”). 
42 Counsel may have little or no opportunity to say at the outset what he or she thinks 
the case involves. In that event, it may be impossible even for observers who are legally 
trained (but lack specific knowledge of the case), let alone for the general public, to 
understand what the dispute is about. See infra notes 75–85 and accompanying text. 
43 Various empirical studies have explored other aspects of oral argument. For example, 
James C. Phillips and Edward L. Carter have posited an inverse relationship between the 
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through which binding law will ultimately be made.44 To be sure, oral argument does 
not exist simply, or even mainly, to inform the public about the issues involved in a 
particular case, or about the judicial process more generally. But that is an important 
purpose of oral argument nonetheless, and a full appraisal of the current practice of 
oral argument necessarily requires consideration of how well the present conception 
of oral argument satisfies that purpose. 
This Article consists of six parts. In Part II, we discuss the history and purposes 
of oral argument in the Supreme Court. We briefly review the development of the 
adjudicatory process in the Supreme Court from its beginnings, when the Court had 
no control over its docket, written submissions barely existed, and the time for oral 
argument was unlimited, to the present, when the Court has virtually total control 
over its docket, written submissions are voluminous, and the time for oral argument 
is severely limited. We also detail possible changes in the Justices’ views as to the 
value and purpose of oral argument and the possible relationship of differences in 
the conduct of the post-argument conference, at which tentative results are generally 
reached, to perceived differences in the conduct of oral argument.   
In Part III, we generally describe the quantitative and qualitative aspects of our 
study, which compares various aspects of oral argument in sets of cases from 
October Terms 1958–60 and October Terms 2010–12. We also situate our study in 
relationship to prior studies and summarize our findings. For both the quantitative 
and qualitative parts of our study, we limited our data set to cases that were partially 
or fully argued on Tuesdays during each of the six terms. In this way, we examined 
                                                            
number of words that a Justice speaks and the amount of information that Justice is seeking. 
James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Oral Argument in the Early Roberts Court: A 
Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Individual Justice Behavior, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 325, 330–32, 336 (2010) [hereinafter Phillips & Carter, Oral Argument]. According 
to Phillips and Carter, the most talkative Justices (Breyer and Scalia) tend to seek less 
information by their interventions, while Justice Alito (the most taciturn Justice, except for 
Justice Thomas) most frequently uses his interventions to seek information. Id. at 33738. 
They also found that the Justices typically seek more information from the side with which 
they disagree. See id. at 388. That study therefore concluded that the Justices use statements 
most frequently to support counsel and persuade their colleagues, while they use questions 
to express doubt. In a second study, Phillips and Carter compared the information-seeking 
practices of the Justices during the period 20042009 with those reflected in twelve cases 
from the period 19631965. See James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Source of 
Information or “Dog and Pony Show”?: Judicial Information Seeking During U.S. Supreme 
Court Oral Argument, 19631965 & 20042009, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 169–71 
(2010) [hereinafter Phillips & Carter, Source of Information]. Phillips and Carter concluded 
that the Justices in the earlier period sought more information and spoke fewer words than 
the Justices in the later period. Id. at 158. While not disproving Chief Justice Roberts’s claim, 
their study suggested that the Justices’ behavior had changed in a way that will not be 
discovered solely by counting questions. Id. at 169–71. 
44 See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that 
judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”). 
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approximately 170 cases (approximately ninety cases from the earlier period and 
approximately eighty cases from the later period). In the quantitative part of our 
study, we focused on several simple and straight-forward criteria: the total number 
of words spoken by the Justices and counsel; the number of speaking turns of the 
Justices; the number of questions asked by the Justices; and the number of 
noninterrogatory statements made by the Justices. We then compared the various 
Terms according to these criteria.45 In the qualitative part of our study, we analyzed 
selected oral argument transcripts from the relevant periods to look more closely at 
the structure of oral argument, the precise nature of the Justices’ interventions, the 
length of the attorneys’ opening remarks, and the length of the longest attorney 
monologues. The point of the qualitative analysis was to give some flesh through 
concrete examples to the more general statistical analysis contained in the 
quantitative part. We also looked at particular argument transcripts with a view 
toward understanding the dynamics of the argument from a qualitative perspective, 
noting such factors as the Justices’ apparent efforts to help out one side or the other, 
the interruptions occasioned by the Justices’ jokes, and the apparent harshness with 
which the Justices sometimes treat counsel. 
In Part IV, we provide a fuller description of our quantitative methodology, 
and, in Part V, we describe in detail the results of our quantitative comparison of the 
two data sets from October Terms 1958–60 and October Terms 2010–12. The 
portrait of oral argument that emerges from the second period is quite different from 
that of the first. Although the amount of time generally allotted for oral argument in 
the second period was only half the time allotted in the earlier period, the Justices 
actually increased their total words per case by almost 24%, while the number of 
words spoken by counsel decreased by about 46%. The extent to which the Justices 
seemed to dominate oral argument in the later cases was striking. 
In Part VI, we report on the results of our qualitative comparison. For example, 
the Justices in the older cases typically allowed counsel a substantial amount of time 
at the beginning of the argument to explain the background of the case and their 
                                                            
45 The principal aim of our study was to determine whether the nature and conduct of 
oral argument had changed in the last half century or so. For that reason, we looked to a 
period (October Terms 1958–60) antedating the earliest reference period chosen by Chief 
Justice Roberts (October Term 1980) and were not specifically interested in proving or 
disproving the precise point made by Chief Justice Roberts—that is, that the level of 
questioning had not changed since 1980. Nonetheless, curiosity caused us to look closely at 
October Term 1980, the earlier of the two Terms he had studied, using the same methodology 
and criteria that we used to analyze the six Terms in our data set. We found that there were 
forty-six cases argued on Tuesdays during October Term 1980. The Justices spoke a total of 
108,551 words in those cases, while the attorneys spoke 173,522 words. Thus, the ratio of 
Justice words to attorney words was 0.625. That ratio compared favorably with the ratio we 
found for the October Terms 2010–12 cases (0.627) and was much higher than the ratio we 
found for the October Terms 1958–60 cases (0.275). In other words, the Chief Justice’s 
conclusion seems to be supported by the evidence insofar as the ratio of Justice words to 
lawyer words is concerned. Also, according to our count, the Justices asked ninety-five 
questions per case and took 131 speaking turns per case in the October Term 1980 cases. See 
infra notes 102–104 and accompanying text. 
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understanding of the issues presented for decision, whereas the Justices in the later 
cases typically began their questioning almost immediately—sometimes beginning 
as soon as counsel had identified herself for the record. In addition, the tone of the 
Justices’ interactions with counsel in the later cases is substantially different from 
that of the earlier cases. Among other things, the Justices appear more likely to speak 
harshly to counsel or to interrupt counsel with jokes, often at counsel’s expense. In 
Part VII, we restate the findings of our empirical study, draw some conclusions from 
those findings, and offer some observations about what our quantitative and 
qualitative analyses suggest concerning the current state of oral argument in the 
Supreme Court and its implications for our democracy. 
Our data, though admittedly limited, strongly suggest that oral argument is a 
far different enterprise today than it was in the earlier period we studied. It is not 
clear that oral argument now serves all of the purposes that it served in the past, and 
it is not clear that the change in oral argument is one that reflects any conscious 
purpose on the part of the Justices. We therefore conclude that the Justices should 
give appropriate consideration to what they collectively deem to be the purposes of 
oral argument and to what they wish to accomplish at oral argument. In particular, 
the Court needs to consider whether its current approach to oral argument is 
consistent with the traditional purposes and objectives of oral argument, particularly 
from the perspectives of the parties’ and the public’s interests, but also from the 
Court’s own perspective. We also suggest that the Court, given its greatly reduced 
caseload, might wish to reconsider the amount of time allotted for oral argument, 
give serious consideration to the ways in which the Justices interact, and consider 
whether the apparent use of oral argument as a substitute for direct communication 
among the Justices is the best use of the only time available for counsel to interact 
with the Justices. 
 
II.  THE AIM OF ORAL ARGUMENT AND THE POST-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE 
 
In the beginning, the Supreme Court’s appellate caseload was relatively light,46 
and the Court followed the “oral tradition” that was brought from the mother 
country.47 The Justices mainly learned about a case through oral presentation, and 
                                                            
46 See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3435 (1928) (stating the Court’s 
appellate caseload rose “[f]rom fifty-one cases docketed in the February Term, 1803 . . . to 
ninety-eight in the February Term, 1810”). The Justices’ heavy workload mainly resulted 
from their circuit-riding duties. Id. at 1417; see also James M. O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 219, 223–24 (1992) (discussing the Justices’ circuit-riding duties as part of the 
controversy surrounding the Judiciary Act of 1801). 
47 See R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482, 483 (1994) (“A brief has no 
[sic] always been ‘a necessity’ in the United States. Following English practice, early 
appellate practice in this country was ‘an essentially oral medium,’ something that surprises 
many who first encounter descriptions of successive days of oral argument in early cases.”) 
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an unlimited amount of time was allowed for oral presentations. Oral arguments in 
the Marshall Court went on for days at a time, for example, and the Justices rarely 
asked questions.48 Written submissions were scant or nonexistent, and cases were 
heard on the original record, with only one set of the papers available to the 
                                                            
(quoting G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 
203 (1988)). As Cozine points out, however, “from very early in its history the Court required 
some form of written submission.” Id. at 486. In 1795, the Court required that lawyers submit 
“a statement of the material points of the case.” Id. (citing SUP. CT. R. 30, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
v (1821). In 1821, the Court required the filing of a “printed brief or abstract . . . containing 
. . . points of law and fact.” Id. As Cozine notes, however, it would be a mistake to assume 
that such a filing necessarily would contain “legal argument,” as we understand that term. 
Id.; see also 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 467 
(1922) (discussing the typical method for oral argument before the Supreme Court); William 
H. Rehnquist, From Webster to Word-Processing: The Ascendance of the Appellate Brief, 1 
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 12 (1999) (discussing the history of oral arguments before the 
Supreme Court); Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court: The Felt 
Necessities of the Time, 1985 SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y. Y.B. 22, 22–23, available at 
http://supremecourthistory.org/assets/pub_journal_1985.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2F 
FL-LLUV. Until recently, the “oral tradition” in England meant that appellate judges heard 
the whole case orally, sometimes for many days, and then delivered their judgments from 
the bench. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 23 (2008); J.R. SPENCER, 
JACKSON’S MACHINERY OF JUSTICE 91–92 (8th ed. 1989). The point was to ensure the 
transparency of the judicial process. POSNER, at 2–3. 
48 G. Edward White has described the importance of oral argument in the Marshall 
Court: 
 
Advocacy before the Marshall Court was essentially an oral exercise, and, because 
of the unlimited time given to arguments and the absence of interruptions from 
Justices, an exercise in oratory. Oral arguments were the chief source of the 
Justices’ information about a case: the Justices sat silently, taking notes, because 
their notes would often be their sole source of information in rendering a decision. 
 
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE, 18151835, at 781 
(abridged ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1988). Currently, only the most exceptional circumstances 
can tempt the Court to grant additional time. In National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), the Affordable Care Act case, for example, the Court 
heard six hours of argument over a three-day period. Order Allocating Oral Argument Time, 
Order issued 2-21-12. Similarly, in Obergefell v. Hodges, 125 S.Ct. 2574 (2015), the same-
sex marriage case, the Court allowed two and a half hours for oral argument. Order of 
Argument, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). In Sebelius, the Court had consolidated several lower 
court cases for argument, and the Court consolidated three separate petitions for certiorari in 
Obergefell. Of course, both cases also presented novel and important questions of federal 
constitutional law. 
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Justices.49 As the country grew, however, so did the Supreme Court’s caseload,50 
and unlimited oral argument eventually became a luxury that the Court could not 
afford.51 In 1849, the Court limited oral argument to two hours to the side.52 That 
remained the case through the 1920s.53 Since then, the time for oral argument has 
been reduced further, first to one hour and then to thirty minutes to the side, which 
remains the norm today.54 Written submissions, which have become easier and 
cheaper to reproduce, have taken on greater importance, particularly as the time 
allotted for oral argument has shrunk.55 In recent years, nonparties increasingly have 
                                                            
49 See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay (Feb. 24, 1812), in 1 LIFE AND 
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 216 (William Wetmore Story ed. 1851) (noting that the argument 
in one then-recent case had proceeded for five days, while a 230-page brief had also been 
filed). Story noted that, “The mode of arguing causes in the Supreme Court is excessively 
prolix and tedious; but generally the subject is exhausted, and it is not very difficult to 
perceive at the close of the cause, in many cases, where the press of the argument and of the 
law lies.” Id. at 215. 
50 During most of the nineteenth century, the Court was required to hear all of the cases 
that fell within its jurisdiction, which made the Court’s caseload increasingly burdensome as 
the nation and its commercial activities expanded. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 
46, at 86; see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s 
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 742–43 (2001) (recounting course of 
legislative enactments whereby Congress reduced the Supreme Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction by transferring some classes of cases to the discretionary docket). As early as 
1824, the Court permitted cases to be submitted without oral argument. Cozine, supra note 
47, at 487 n.28. The Court also fashioned other shortcuts to facilitate its work. See, e.g., 
Newell v. Norton, 70 U.S. 257, 267–68 (1865) (affirming the judgment, without any 
searching review of the record, where there was “ample testimony to support the decision”). 
In 1891, Congress passed the Evarts Act, which created the regional courts of appeals and 
granted the Court some discretion to decline to hear cases within its jurisdiction. See 
Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 43 (2012)). 
51 See Barry Sullivan, Law and Discretion in Supreme Court Recusals: A Response to 
Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 912 (2013).  
52 SUP. CT. R. 53, 48 U.S. (7 How.) v (1849); see also David C. Frederick, Supreme 
Court Advocacy in the Early Nineteenth Century, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1, 13 (2005). 
53 See CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS 
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 61 (1928). 
54 See SUP. CT. R. 44, 398 U.S. 1058 (1970). The Court has occasionally enlarged the 
time for oral argument in a particular case or set of related cases, as in National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius. See supra note 48.  
55 As previously noted, Justice Ginsburg has observed that briefs are much more 
important than oral argument in the decision of a case. Robert P. Burns & Steven G. 
Calabresi, A Conversation with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, C-SPAN (Sept. 15, 2009), 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?288900-1/conversation-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg, archived 
at http://perma.cc/E6KF-FGNT; see also Adam Liptak, Similar Justices, Far Different Job 
Paths, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014 at A14. Indeed, Justice Thomas has stated that he generally 
knows how he will vote in a case before he hears the oral argument. See supra note 37 (stating 
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sought to influence the Court through the filing of amicus curiae briefs, scores of 
which may be filed in high-profile cases.56 Except for the United States and state 
governments, however, amici are rarely granted the opportunity to present oral 
argument.57 Finally, the Court’s caseload has decreased substantially in the last thirty 
or forty years, both because Congress has eliminated most of the Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction and because the Court has significantly reduced its discretionary review 
docket.58 As the Court’s merits docket has shrunk, however, the Court has not 
increased the time allotted for argument.59 
                                                            
that Justice Thomas typically prepares a pre-argument outline of his decision). That would 
not have been the case when briefs and other papers could not easily be reproduced. Even in 
fairly recent times, before the widespread availability of inexpensive photocopying, for 
example, in forma pauperis petitions were initially reviewed only by the Chief Justice’s law 
clerksa practice that gave the Chief Justice considerable influence over the case selection 
process and the restatement of issues presented in pro se submissions. See, e.g., BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURTA JUDICIAL 
BIOGRAPHY 6569 (1983) (describing the process for reviewing petitions and Justice 
Frankfurter’s concerns about it). 
56 See, e.g., COYLE, supra note 37, at 16061. In Obergefell v. Hodges, Nos. 14-556, 
14-562, 14-571, and 14-474 (June 26, 2015), for example, approximately 140 amicus curiae 
briefs were filed at the merits stage. Supreme Court of the U.S., Amicus Briefs on the Merits, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/ObergefellHodges/AmicusBriefs/ (last updated Aug. 11, 
2015); archived at http://perma.cc/X4N3-X49G. According to a recent study by Paul M. 
Collins, Jr., one or more amicus curiae briefs were filed in 23% of Supreme Court cases on 
average from 1946 to 1960; the proportion rose to 31% in 1961 and to 44% in 1969. Paul M. 
Collins, Jr., Interest Groups and Their Influence on Judicial Policy, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
JUDICIAL POLITICS 221, 226 (Kevin T. McGuire ed., 2012). The average was 60% in the 
1970s and 80% in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, the average exceeded 90%, with the 
proportion reaching 98% in 2007. Id. 
57 See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 765 (9th ed. 2007). 
58 During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the number of cases on the Court’s 
oral argument calendar shrunk by about 50%, from approximately 150 cases each year to 75. 
Cordray & Corday, supra note 50, at 738. The Court’s merits docket has remained at about 
the same size since then. See Opinions, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/opinions.aspx (last visited Aug. 11, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/5R6M-RCXU. With only half the cases to consider, the Justices obviously 
can be far better prepared than previously, but the decline in the Court’s caseload has had 
other consequences as well. As Chief Justice Roberts has suggested, for example, the United 
States is more likely to participate in cases to which it is not a party. See Roberts, supra note 
16, at 79 (noting the Solicitor General’s presence in more than 80% of argued cases). 
59 Throughout the Court’s history, the practice of oral argument has been affected by 
other factors, including the personalities, backgrounds, and relative influence of individual 
Justices, as well as their living and working arrangements. For example,  
 
The questioning of advocates . . . during [Chief Justice] Vinson’s tenure reflected 
the particular personalities of [the Justices]. On occasion, Justice Rutledge 
returned to chambers after argument quite obviously pleased with the fact that an 
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At its best, oral argument serves a variety of important purposes. Oral argument 
provides the Justices with an opportunity to ask counsel questions, which facilitates 
informed decision-making.60 Similarly, oral argument provides counsel with their 
only opportunity to hear and respond to the Justices’ questions and concerns—
concerns that may not be self-evident and can be answered only if they are 
expressed. Oral argument also allows counsel to emphasize to the Court what they 
think is important about their case and to explain the parties’ arguments in ways that 
                                                            
experienced lawyer had been unable to make an effective response to his question 
. . . . [T]he Justice who was by far the most active in posing questions to counsel 
. . . was Felix Frankfurter. Sometimes I received the impression that he had not 
yet read the briefs and was relying on counsel to identify the exact issue in 
dispute. On other occasions he treated the advocate in a way that reminded me of 
a law professor dealing with a student who needed to be told what earlier cases 
had decided. 
 
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 71 (2011); see also 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 6465 (describing Justice Frankfurter’s tendentious manner at 
oral argument). The Justices’ living arrangements also have had an influence, if not on oral 
argument directly, on the way in which the Court has accomplished its work. Thus, the 
members of the Marshall Court had ample opportunity to discuss cases informally because 
they lived in the same boardinghouse while in Washington. See THE SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE (19401985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 31 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE (19401985)] (“In 1801, Marshall arranged for the Justices to live together at 
Conrad and McMunn’s boardinghouse on Capitol Hill . . . . [T]he Justices [later] roomed 
together at . . . other Washington boardinghouses and residential hotels.”); R. KENT 
NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 78 
(1985) (“Boardinghouse living . . . worked to overcome the sectional and ideological 
divisions among the justices, fusing their work and leisure and strengthening their sense of 
institutional identity.”). Later Justices, who likewise lacked individual government offices 
but maintained private residences in the capital, did most of their work at home; that did not 
change until after the completion of the Supreme Court Building in 1935. See STEVENS, at 
30–31; see SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 67 (noting that most of the Justices continued to 
work at home even after the building was completed). 
60 For several reasons, the level of questioning may be greater in some cases than in 
others. For example, the level of questioning (and the number of words spoken by the 
Justices) will normally increase as the number of Justices who are present at oral argument 
increases. See EPSTEIN, LANDES, & POSNER, supra note 3, at 324. The identities of present 
or absent Justices may also be significant because some Justices may be more or less inclined 
to ask questions, and some Justices may be better questioners—or at least able to ask 
questions more succinctly—than others. The perceived importance of a case may also 
increase the level of questioning. Id. The level of questioning may also increase when one or 
both parties have not adequately briefed the case. In addition, it has been suggested that the 
Justices’ need for information is likely to increase in less salient cases. See Andrea McAtee 
& Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: When and How Do Legal 
Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 259, 259 (2007).   
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sometimes cannot be easily accomplished in written form. Oral argument allows 
counsel, after all the briefs have been filed, to crystallize or distill the relevant issues 
and thus provide the Court with their most mature and considered understandings. 
Oral argument also serves to assure the parties that their claims are being fully and 
fairly considered, and it performs a significant public function by exposing the 
Supreme Court’s adjudicatory process—a process that creates binding law—to the 
public. Oral argument allows the parties to explain to the public, as well as the 
Justices, what they think the case is about, and it provides the Justices with the 
opportunity to show the public, as well as the parties, that they take the parties’ 
concerns seriously, and that they have personally engaged and seriously considered 
the issues, be they momentous or mundane. Oral argument also allows the Justices 
to show that they “do their own work,”61 as Justice Brandeis put it, rather than 
leaving it all to law clerks or other functionaries.  
Of course, oral argument also provides the Justices with an opportunity to test 
the implications or limitations of the parties’ arguments, to seek clarification, and to 
acquire additional information.62 It provides the Justices with an opportunity to 
                                                            
61 See WYZANSKI, supra note 40, at 61 (“I well remember a remark . . . Justice 
[Brandeis] made to me when I first entered the public service: ‘The reason the public thinks 
so much of the . . . Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who 
do their own work.’”). 
62 For example, one study has suggested that the Justices typically ask more questions 
in less salient cases, presumably because they are less certain about how they should vote 
and therefore need more information. See McAtee & McGuire, supra note 60, at 260–62. 
The same study shows that the Justices ask fewer questions—but make more statements—
in more salient cases, presumably because their interventions in such cases are more likely 
to be motivated by a felt need to influence their colleagues than by a need to inform 
themselves. See id. at 273. Thus, if salient cases represent a higher percentage of the total 
than they did in the past, the Justices’ overall ratio of statements to questions is likely to be 
higher now. That conclusion might not follow, however, if the Justices have also become 
more talkative in general, or alternatively, if their questions are aimed at persuading their 
colleagues, rather than simply eliciting information. Another factor might be the Court’s 
attitude toward its own role in information gathering. The Justices may be less likely to ask 
questions for the purpose of information gathering at oral argument if they are inclined to 
seek information on their own. Thus, in 1975, Arthur Miller and Jerome Barron argued that 
the Court appeared to have become more “willing to inform itself,” as opposed to depending 
on the parties for relevant information. See Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The 
Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975). Whether that continues to be the case 
remains to be seen. Since the time of the Miller and Barron study, however, the number of 
amicus curiae briefs has greatly expanded and much “untested” information is typically 
presented to the Court in such briefs. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Seeking Facts, Justices Settle 
for What Briefs Tell Them, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02 
/us/politics/the-dubious-sources-of-some-supreme-court-facts.html?_r=2 (“‘The [C]ourt is 
inundated with 11th-hour, untested, advocacy-motivated claims of factual expertise.’”) 
Moreover, at least some lower court judges have thought it proper to search the web for 
information or seek to establish facts by having their law clerks conduct experiments. See 
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communicate with each other about the case (which they generally do at oral 
argument for the first time since the grant of certiorari), test their own positions, 
highlight the weaknesses in alternative views, and seek support for the outcomes 
they may prefer.63 In recent years, several Justices have emphasized the importance 
                                                            
Lubavitch-Chabad of Ill., Inc. v. Nw. Univ., 772 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.); 
Mitchell v. JCG Indus., Inc., 745 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.). If the Justices have 
already gathered information to the extent they deem necessary, the nature and tone of their 
interventions at oral argument are likely to be different than they would be if “information-
seeking” were actually the goal. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 13439. 
63 The federal courts of appeals decide many cases without hearing oral argument. See, 
e.g., MAYER BROWN LLP, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE 440–41 (Philip Allen Lacovara 
ed., 2008) (noting, for example, that the Fifth Circuit may grant oral argument in fewer than 
20% of its cases, the Tenth Circuit hears argument in fewer than 30% of the cases it decides, 
and the Second Circuit still hears argument (of some length) in virtually all of its cases); see 
also THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS 108–17 (1994) (discussing elimination of oral argument in many cases 
in the courts of appeals). The value of oral argument is contested. Martineau, supra note 20, 
at 22 (“[I]ts real contribution to sound decisionmaking is questioned by an increasing number 
of commentators.”). Even in relatively recent times, however, some of the Supreme Court’s 
most important decisions have been rendered in cases in which briefs were filed on the eve 
of oral argument, with decisions being rendered shortly thereafter. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See also Bush v. Gore, 
No.00-949, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?file 
name=/docketfiles/00-949.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/X5QW-REKL (detailing the 
chronology in the Supreme Court of Bush v. Gore); Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First 
Amendment: Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive ‘Right to Know’, 72 MD. 
L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2012) (detailing the chronology in the Supreme Court of New York Times 
Co.); MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 149–77 (1977) (detailing the chronology in the Supreme Court of 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.). At least in those cases one may fairly assume that oral 
argument played an important role. Moreover, the Justices have routinely vouched for its 
importance. See, e.g., Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: 
Conversations with Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 298 (2000) 
(quoting Justice Blackmun) (“‘Many times confusion (in the brief) is clarified by what the 
lawyers have to say [at argument].’”); Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
Appellate System Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 
F.R.D. 195, 254 (West 1975) (quoting Justice Brennan) (“‘[There were] many occasions 
when my judgment of a decision has turned on what happened in oral argument . . . .’”); 
Johnson et al., supra note 29, at 245 (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) (citation omitted) 
(“[O]ral argument . . . contribute[s] significantly to the development of precedents.”); John 
M. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal?, 41 
CORNELL L.Q. 6, 7 (1955) (noting that the importance of oral argument for “getting at the 
real heart of an issue.”); Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme 
Court, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2 (1951) (“[T]he Justices would answer unanimously that . . . 
they rely heavily on oral presentations.”). As one study has suggested, judges (including the 
Justices) may not be reliable informants when it comes to the subject of judging. See 
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of oral argument, not as an opportunity for the parties to make their best case to the 
Court, for counsel to answer the Justices’ questions or concerns, or for the Justices 
to acquire additional information from counsel, but as an opportunity for the Justices 
to persuade each other. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted,  
 
oral argument . . . is the only time before conference discussion of the case 
later in the week when all of the judges are expected to . . . concentrate on 
one particular case. The judges’ questions, although nominally directed to 
the attorney . . . may in fact be for the benefit of their colleagues.64  
                                                            
EPSTEIN, LANDES, & POSNER, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing that despite the prominent 
role played by judges, “the determinants of their decisions” are “not well understood by 
lawyers, law professors, or even many judges.” On the other hand, social scientists 
increasingly have used social science methods to “penetrate self-serving judicial rhetoric, go 
beyond judges’ limited self-understanding, and place the study of judicial behavior on a 
scientific basis”). It is not surprising that the Justices would speak approvingly of oral 
argument, which is dear to the hearts of lawyers. Moreover, the Justices may be sincere in 
their praise of oral argument, while valuing it for reasons quite different from those that 
motivate the practicing bar. On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg recently voiced her 
opposition to the videotaping of oral arguments on the ground that the public might attribute 
undue weight to the oral argument, as opposed to the more important components of the 
Court’s decisional process—the written submissions and private discussion, reflection, and 
writing. See Liptak, supra note 55. Justice Ginsburg explained that: 
 
What the public will see is two people with a half-hour a side having a 
conversation with the [J]ustices, and they come away with the idea that, well, the 
best debater is going to win that contest . . . . It would leave a false impression of 
the appellate process to think that the oral argument is what is decisive in the 
cases.  
 
Id. Justice Kagan, who also was interviewed for the story, acknowledged Justice Ginsburg’s 
concerns, as well as “the possibility [that the Justices might be tempted to engage in] 
grandstanding,” but emphasized the importance of transparency and suggested that “‘for the 
most part the court would look pretty good.’” Id. 
64 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 244 (new ed. 2001). Likewise, 
Justice Ginsburg has suggested that “oral argument is a time when Justices seek to persuade 
each other.” Phillips & Carter, Source of Information, supra note 43, at 90 (citation omitted). 
Justice Stevens has explained that “you have a point in mind that you think may not have 
been brought out in the briefs well [and] want to be sure your colleagues don’t overlook [it].” 
Id. And Justice Kennedy has stated that, “oral argument [is not] a series of dialogues between 
attorneys and Justices, . . . ‘what is happening is the court is having a conversation with itself 
through the intermediary of the attorney.’” Id. at 91. Although the ordinary appellate process 
is different in many respects from that of the Supreme Court, a distinguished federal appellate 
judge has made a similar point about oral argument in the intermediate courts. See FRANK 
M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 133 (1994) (“Oral argument is 
really the first stage of the conferencing among the judges.”). On occasion, as in Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), the Justices have departed from their usual practice of not 
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The apparent growth of the “colleague persuasion” aspect of oral argument has 
coincided with certain changes in the format of the post-argument conference. In 
earlier times, the Justices apparently spoke twice on each case at the conference: 
they would first give their views of the case, speaking in descending order of 
seniority, and then register their votes in the opposite order.65 That practice 
apparently changed at some point, so that the Justices now speak only once; each 
Justice gives his or her view of the case and votes at the same time, speaking in order 
of seniority, with the Chief Justice speaking and voting first.66 The contemporary 
conference is thought to have become very formally structured, with little, if any, 
give-and-take; the Justices do not interrupt each other or talk out of turn.67 There is 
                                                            
communicating about a case prior to argument. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE 
SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 199 (2007) (“It was not a usual conference. 
Because of the urgency, the Justices had already exchanged several memos on the case, even 
before oral argument.”). When Justice Brandeis was on the losing side of a conference vote, 
he sometimes sent his colleagues a post-conference memorandum further arguing his 
position during the interval between the vote and the circulation of a draft opinion, but “[t]he 
ploy rarely worked.” See LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE OF 
AMERICA’S TRULY GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 250 (1983). Justice Scalia also 
reportedly sends post-argument memos (sometimes referred to as “ninograms”) to his 
colleagues. See JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: A 
HAMILTONIAN ON THE SUPREME COURT 27 (2006). 
65 STEVENS, supra note 59, at 15455; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 210 (1993). 
66 Segal and Spaeth believe that the change happened in either the Vinson or the Warren 
era. Id. However, Justice Stevens thinks that it most likely happened under Chief Justice 
Burger. STEVENS, supra note 59, at 155. 
67 Chief Justice Rehnquist said that he was surprised when he joined the Court to find 
out that there was no conversation, let alone persuasion, at the conference: the Justices simply 
explained their reasons and voted. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 66, at 211. That has not 
always been the case. Chief Justice Hughes may have led the conference with the authority 
of a “strict teacher in the classroom,” but his successor, Chief Justice Stone, preferred “a 
freewheeling discussion in which [he] was more a participant than a leader.” BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 247 (1993). Ironically, it was Chief Justice 
Stone who actually was the nineteenth-century schoolmaster. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, 
HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 65 (1956) (describing Stone’s early career as a 
high school teacher and vice principal). In any event, Chief Justice Stone was “eager[] to 
have all issues thoroughly explored,” did not follow the tradition of requiring that the Justices 
speak in turn, and relished doing battle with anyone who disagreed with him. SCHWARTZ, at 
247. According to Professor Schwartz, “Discussion became wrangling and the Justices 
emerged from these interminable meetings irritated and exhausted, their [personal and 
professional] differences inflamed from excessive argument.” Id. at 247–48. Chief Justice 
Vinson, Stone’s successor, “was even more inept . . . in leading the conference.” Id. at 254. 
Chief Justice Warren, on the other hand, provided strong leadership to the conference and 
helped steer cases because of the way in which he framed the issues. Id. at 269. In his 
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little opportunity for conversation, let alone persuasion.68 In addition, and perhaps 
because the conference under Chief Justice Burger had become a meandering affair, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was intent on moving things along, so that the conference 
became shorter and more streamlined.69 Chief Justice Roberts reportedly has placed 
more emphasis on the Justices’ actually talking and listening to each other.70 
Some commentators have suggested that the very formal, modern conference, 
whether brief or protracted, is simply unsuited to genuine discussion or collegial 
deliberation.71 Judge Posner, who believes that deliberation is vastly overrated in 
any event (because judges rarely change their minds based on further reflection or 
                                                            
memoirs, Chief Justice Warren explained the way in which he guided the conference in 
Brown v. Board of Education, following its re-argument in November 1953:  
 
To return to our method of handling the school segregation cases, we were all 
impressed with their importance and the desirability of achieving unanimity if 
possible. Realizing that when a person once announces he has reached a 
conclusion it is more difficult for him to change his thinking, we decided that we 
would dispense with our usual custom of formally expressing our individual views 
at the first conference and would confine ourselves for a time to informal 
discussion of the briefs, the arguments made at the hearing, and our own 
independent research on each conference day, reserving our final opinions until 
the discussions were concluded. 
 
EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 285 (1977). The Court 
“followed this plan until the following February, when it was agreed that [they] were ready 
to vote.” Id. 
68 Chief Justice Rehnquist came to believe that it would not make sense to allow for a 
more freewheeling discussion. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 66, at 211. His view may 
have been a reaction, in part, to Chief Justice Burger’s apparently inept leadership of the 
conference. See STEVENS, supra note 59, at 155. Justice Scalia had the same initial reaction, 
but he has remained more critical of the contemporary conference, saying that “to call our 
discussion of a case a conference is really something of a misnomer.” SEGAL ET AL., THE 
SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 304 (2005). According to Justice Scalia, 
the conference is “more a statement of the views of the nine Justices, after which the totals 
are added and the case is assigned.” Id.  
69 BLACK, JOHNSON & WEDEKING, supra note 10, at 13. 
70 NPR News, Roberts’ Court Produces More Unanimous Decisions, NPR NEWS (May 
22, 2006, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5421326, on file 
with the Utah Law Review. 
71 See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 30607 (“At the conference judges 
speak their piece, usually culminating quickly in a statement of the vote they’re casting. They 
speak either in order of seniority, as in the Supreme Court, or in reverse order of seniority, 
as in many of the federal courts of appeals. Often there is no discussion at all but merely 
statements of the judges’ votes. It is a serious breach of etiquette to interrupt a judge when 
he has the floor at the post-argument conference, and this too discourages free give-and-
take.”).  
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in response to their colleagues’ arguments),72 has suggested that the purpose of the 
conference is simply to record the Justices’ votes and thereby determine the result.73 
                                                            
72 See POSNER, REFLECTIONS, supra note 6, at 171. Judge Posner has expressed the view 
that individual judges have little difficulty deciding cases: “It is not a protracted process 
unless the judge has difficulty making up his mind, which is a psychological trait rather than 
an index of conscientiousness.” POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 47, at 299. In other 
words, unless a judge is psychologically challenged, he will have little difficulty in deciding 
for himself on the correct outcome in a case and will then be relatively impervious to the 
persuasion of others. “In such situations the principal effect of arguing is . . . to drive the 
antagonists farther apart—or at least to cause them to dig in their heels.” Id. at 302. But see 
POSNER, REFLECTIONS, at 129 (“When trying to make up his mind about how to vote, a judge 
should remind himself of his limitations . . . . Not that it is wrong, let alone possible, to judge 
without biases.”). Historians suggest that, at least in the early Republic, the Justices may 
have been open to persuasion by their colleagues. See NEWMYER, supra note 59, at 78 (“Story 
remembered the interchanges in conference as freewheeling, a ‘pleasant and animated 
interchange of legal acumen.’ Judicial conferences took place ‘at our lodgings and often 
come to a very quick, and I trust, a very accurate opinion in a few hours.’”); CHARLES F. 
HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 15 (1996) 
(“In both courtroom and conference chamber, Marshall was a patient and attentive listener . 
. . . [T]he key to his leadership lay in his openness to argument and persuasion, his 
willingness to subordinate his own views if necessary to obtain a single opinion of the Court. 
If the Court most often spoke through the chief justice, the opinion was the product of 
collaborative deliberation, carried out in a spirit of mutual concession and 
accommodation.”). Others have disagreed with Judge Posner about the degree to which 
serious discussion currently takes place among federal appellate judges. See, e.g., Evan C. 
Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
2297, 2310 (1999) (discussing the benefits that arise when members of multimember courts 
share views and increase the likelihood that all plausible positions will be explored); Harry 
T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 
1360 (1998) (“[W]e do spend a great deal of time listening to each other’s views and 
considering arguments each of us makes.”); Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, 
Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate 
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1951 n.197 (2009) (expressing disagreement with 
Judge Posner’s assertion that judges do not deliberate very much and that deliberation is 
overrated); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1646 (2003) (noting that judges in a collegial atmosphere are more 
likely to “go back and forth in their deliberations over disputed and difficult issues until 
agreement is reached.”). Pauline Kim has written insightfully about the dynamics of panel 
decision-making in the courts of appeals. See Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on 
the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1319, 1319 (2009). Ironically, Judge Posner has recently suggested that his opinion 
for a divided court in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 
2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), was mistaken, and that Judge Terrence Evans’s dissenting 
opinion was correct. See POSNER, REFLECTIONS, at 84–85; Josh Gerstein, Judge: My Key 
Voter ID Ruling Was Wrong, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-
radar/2013/10/judge-my-key-voter-id-ruling-was-wrong-174890.html (Oct. 11, 2013) 
archived at http://perma.cc/C9LS-RC2Z. According to Judge Posner, the panel would have 
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Like other students of the Court, Judge Posner has suggested that the Justices 
typically use questions or other statements at oral argument, either to make points 
they want to make sure their colleagues are thinking about or to squash positions 
that they think a colleague might otherwise find appealing. By using counsel as foils, 
the Justices are able to challenge their colleagues’ views without violating norms of 
collegiality—which they might be perceived as doing if they confronted their 
colleagues directly in a frank give-and-take in the conference room.74 Thus, 
interaction with counsel at oral argument substitutes for candor in the conference 
room.75  
Finally, oral argument is important because it provides the public with an 
opportunity to observe their government in action and to be assured that important 
questions of public law are being considered in a rigorous, dignified, fair, and 
dispassionate way.76 This aspect of oral argument recognizes the seemingly 
anomalous role of an unelected judiciary in a democratic society and follows from 
the recognition that Supreme Court decisions not only give specific shape to the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens, but frequently elaborate the rules by which the 
affairs of government are conducted. For these reasons, it is essential that Supreme 
Court proceedings be accessible and understandable to the public and as transparent 
as is consistent with the nature of adjudication and with the other purposes to be 
served by oral argument.77 
                                                            
decided the case correctly “if the lawyers had provided us with a lot of information about the 
abuse of voter identification laws.” Id. 
73 See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (19401985), supra note 59, at 117 (“The 
nature of the conference continued to evolve under Burger’s leadership. The Justices became 
less interested in using the conference to exchange ideas, debate, or persuade others. Instead, 
they began to view the conference merely as an opportunity to declare their individual 
positions and count votes.”); POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 30809. 
74 See POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 308; WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, 
THE GREAT JUSTICES, 194154: BLACK, DOUGLAS, FRANKFURTER, AND JACKSON IN 
CHAMBERS 119 (2006) (“Frankfurter . . . felt the strength of Black’s convictions and 
resistance when, on one occasion at least, they nearly came to blows at conference.”). 
75 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 307, 309. Among other things, 
Epstein and her coauthors argue that the Justices are reluctant, because of concerns about 
collegiality, to challenge their colleagues’ ideas directly when they have the opportunity to 
do so in conference, and that they therefore use oral argument as a way of doing so indirectly. 
Id.  
76 See, e.g., Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. 
CT. REV. 127, 179 (“One of the reasons Congress persisted in requiring members of the 
Supreme Court to ride circuit in the nineteenth century was a fear of the political 
consequences of isolating the Court from its public. The argument that was made pointed 
perhaps as much to judges’ learning as to judges’ teaching.”). 
77 Id. at 180 (“Whether the Justice should teach the public is not and cannot be in 
question since teaching is inseparable from judging in a democratic regime.”).  
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John W. Davis had it right when he suggested that a cold bench is not an 
advocate’s friend;78 there are few things more unsettling than arguing before a silent 
bench, hearing only one’s own voice and wondering what the judges are thinking. 
In the best of circumstances, a Justice’s questions can provide an advocate with “a 
perfect window” into the Justice’s mind, and “tell[] you exactly what is bothering 
[him or her].”79 But not all interruptions are questions, and not all questions are 
equal. Some interruptions are strategic, some tactical. They do not invariably 
provide a “perfect window” into the Justice’s mind. 
Although the ideal oral argument is often described as a “conversation” among 
judges and lawyers,80 an oral argument is seldom, if ever, a “conversation” among 
equals. It is a defining characteristic of the courtroom that judges not only rule, but 
make the rules; and lawyers are supplicants who must follow the rules—even when 
the judges do not.81 Tough questions are an essential part of oral argument,82 and 
most judges do not abuse their position. But the relationship of judge and counsel is 
not one of equality; sarcasm, rudeness, sharp questioning, and other aggressive 
judicial tactics can easily become an abuse of the power relationship that necessarily 
exists in any courtroom.83 That potential for abuse is enhanced when a Justice openly 
                                                            
78 See John W. Davis, The Argument of An Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 897 (1940). 
79 See Carter G. Phillips, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 15 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 177, 190 (1998).  
80 See, e.g., Liptak, Similar Justices, supra note 55 (noting Justice Ginsburg’s reference 
to oral argument as “a conversation with the justices”). 
81 For example, the Clerk’s guidebook for attorneys contains many admonitions with 
respect to the conduct of attorneys at oral argument, including the observation that, 
“Attempts at humor [by counsel] usually fall flat.” SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., GUIDE FOR 
COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE ARGUED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 11 
(Oct. Term 2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/guidefor 
counsel.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FKB9-3N3D. However, several of the Justices 
frequently interrupt counsel’s arguments with jokes or make jokes at the expense of counsel. 
See, e.g., Liptak, A Most Inquisitive Court?, supra note 36, at 2 (“When the justices are not 
making points, they are cracking wise and keeping score . . . . ‘It turns out that the 
conservatives dominate, even carrying the silence of Justice Thomas, with 207 instances of 
laughter, or 41 instances per justice,’ the study found. ‘The liberal justices trail with 136 
instances—the same number as Justice Scalia on his own.’”).  
82 See POSNER, REFLECTIONS, supra note 6, at 129. 
83 Id. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger is often credited with beginning the contemporary 
conversation about professional civility in a 1971 speech to the American Law Institute. See 
Warren E. Burger, The Necessity of Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971). Not surprisingly, much 
of that conversation has focused on the civility of lawyers, rather than judges. See Peter A. 
Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667, 667–
68, 682–86 (2001). In 1989, however, a survey of over 1,500 lawyers and judges conducted 
by the Seventh Circuit’s Committee on Civility found that many lawyers thought that “judges 
are sarcastic, arrogant, rude, lack respect for lawyers, lack judicial temperament and 
needlessly humiliate lawyers in court.” Id. at 686 (quoting Interim Report of the Committee 
on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 401 (1991)). In the same 
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disrespects a party or her counsel or adopts an explicitly adversarial posture toward 
one side or the other. Thus, Supreme Court advocates can be made to resemble minor 
characters (or mere observers), with the Justices writing the script and commanding 
the stage. The integrity of the process demands some degree of judicial self-restraint, 
and there must be some limit to the amount of time that can be taken up by the 
Justices—in questions, statements, and jokes—before oral argument loses any 
purpose. Finally, because the Supreme Court sits at the pinnacle of the American 
judicial system, the Justices necessarily are seen as role models by judges throughout 
the justice system.84 Based on past experience, it seems likely that what passes as 
appropriate judicial behavior at the Supreme Court will so pass elsewhere. As the 
Justices behave at oral argument, so, too, will appellate judges throughout the land.  
  
                                                            
survey, 22% of the responding judges expressed the view that civility problems exist between 
or among judges in the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 682. 
84 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: 
Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 620 (2009) (“As 
the elite and celebrated institution, or ‘crown jewel,’ of our judiciary, the Supreme Court 
serves as a model for lower courts.”) As Professors Carrington and Cramton have noted, the 
lower federal courts have emulated the Supreme Court in numerous ways with respect to the 
handling of their work. For example, the organizational changes that they have copied have 
“enabled federal judges to be more selective about their work, to delegate more to 
subordinates, and to conduct a legal process that is, like that of the Supreme Court, far less 
transparent than that conducted by their predecessors a few decades ago.” Id. at 620. In 
various ways, “the effect of the Supreme Court as a role model trickles down,” not only to 
the federal courts of appeals, but also to the federal trial courts. Id. at 625. The same is also 
doubtless true with respect to the state courts, which frequently follow the Supreme Court’s 
lead, even in matters in which they are not required to do so. See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen, State 
Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1997) (“Specifically, I want to question the uncritical adoption, 
when giving meaning to state constitutional rights, of verbal formulas that the United States 
Supreme Court uses to measure federal constitutional rights or powers. Some of this dogma 
should be laid to rest by the Supreme Court, as federal law scholars agree; it certainly does 
not deserve a second life, released to stalk the pages of the state reports, where, vampire-like, 
it sucks the life out of fresh constitutional analysis.”). See also John B. Oakley & Arthur F. 
Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil 
Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986) (discussing the influence of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure on the development of state judge-made rules of practice).  
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III.  OUR STUDY, ITS METHODOLOGY, AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PRIOR STUDIES 
 
Scholars have addressed many aspects of oral argument in the Supreme Court: 
the possible relationship between attorney performance and case outcome;85 the 
possible relationship between the number of questions asked of counsel and his or 
her likelihood of prevailing;86 the possible relationship between the Justices’ use of 
extreme words and case outcome;87 the Justices’ relative use of “questions” and 
“statements”88 in more or less salient cases;89 the degree to which the current Justices 
make more or fewer “statements” (as opposed to questions) than their 
predecessors;90 the degree to which the Justices actually seek information at oral 
argument;91 the degree to which the Justices interrupt each other;92 the degree to 
which a Justice’s talkativeness may correlate with his or her influence on the 
outcome of a case;93 the degree to which Justices are more likely to listen carefully 
to a colleague’s interventions based on ideological affinity or the perception that a 
colleague may occupy the ideological middle ground;94 the degree to which the 
addition of one talkative Justice may alter the behavior of other Justices;95 and the 
degree to which the Justices may lack candor when they continue to affirm the 
importance of oral argument.96  
Previous studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of the Supreme 
Court’s decisional processes, and, in particular, to our understanding of oral 
argument.97 But the existing scholarship has not addressed several questions 
suggested by the Chief Justice’s observation that the “level of questioning” in the 
Court has been fairly consistent in the recent past: (1) whether the same conclusion 
                                                            
85 See Johnson et al., supra note 28. 
86 Roberts, supra note 15, at 75; Sarah Levien Shullman, The Illusion of Devil’s 
Advocacy: How the Justices of the Supreme Court Foreshadow Their Decisions During Oral 
Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 271, 272 (2004); Johnson et al., supra note 29, at 242. 
87 Ryan C. Black et al., Emotions, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision 
Making, 73 J. POL. 572, 572–73 (2011). 
88 Andrea McAtee and Kevin McGuire give the words “questions” and “statements” 
their everyday meaning. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. We use the words in a 
slightly different way. See infra notes 107109 and accompanying text. 
89 See McAtee & McGuire, supra note 60, at 273. 
90 See Phillips & Carter, Oral Argument, supra note 43, at 327.  
91 See Phillips & Carter, Source of Information, supra note 43, at 80. 
92 Johnson et al., Pardon the Interruption, supra note 29, at 336. 
93 Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy, supra note 28, at 517. 
94 Id. at 517–18. 
95 EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 330–31.  
96 See id. 
97 Empirical studies are particularly useful, as Judge Posner has noted, because judicial 
decision-making is poorly understood by the bar as well as the public, and even by judges 
themselves. See Posner, supra note 47, at 2. “This unrealism is due to a variety of things, 
including . . . the fact that most judges are cagey, even coy, in discussing what they do.” Id.  
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would apply if one looked at points in time a little earlier and later than those chosen 
by the Chief Justice; (2) whether the nature of the “interruptions” has changed, and 
with it, the Justices’ apparent understanding of the nature and purpose of oral 
argument; and (3) whether any such change is for the good, given the important role 
that the Court plays in contemporary American society.98  
Our study looks more closely at the nature of the Justices’ interventions and 
uses a consistent set of simple and relatively straightforward metrics to compare a 
sample of cases from a three-year period in the recent past (October Terms 2010, 
2011, and 2012) with a sample from a three-year period about twenty years before 
the earlier period chosen by the Chief Justice (October Terms 1958, 1959, and 
1960).99 Our study included all cases argued on Tuesdays during each of those six 
                                                            
98 Barry Friedman has argued that the constitutional crisis of 1937 produced “a tacit 
deal,” whereby “the American people would grant the justices their power, so long as the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution did not stray too far from what a majority 
of the people believed it should be.” BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 3–4 (2009). The promise of a certain degree of transparency might be thought 
ancillary to that “deal.”  
99 According to the Supreme Court website, oral arguments were not routinely 
transcribed until October Term 1968. Even then, the court reporter did not identify the 
individual Justice who was speaking, but simply noted each judicial intervention with the 
word “Question”—without regard to whether the intervention was a true question, a 
statement, or something else. The court reporter began identifying the speaking Justice by 
name in October Term 2004. See Argument Transcripts, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript (last visited June 18, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UWB8-BW54. For purposes of the present study, we have 
used the term “speaking turn” to refer to any intervention by a Justice that is preceded and 
followed by a statement by counsel or another Justice. The Oyez.org website has a nearly 
complete set of unofficial transcripts beginning with the late 1950s and partial coverage for 
earlier periods; the transcripts available on the Oyez.org website identify the Justice who is 
speaking. See Cases, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/ (last visited June 14, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8QMF-8SVD. We have chosen to study the Court as a whole 
during both periods and have not attempted to draw any conclusions or comparisons about 
the relative loquacity of individual Justices in either period. However, in those instances in 
which we were required to rely on the unofficial Oyez transcripts, we also relied on Oyez’s 
designations to determine whether the speaker was an attorney or a Justice. Significantly, for 
both of the periods covered by our study, the membership of the Court remained constant. 
The Justices who sat on the older cases were Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo L. 
Black, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan, William 
J. Brennan, Jr., Charles E. Whittaker, and Potter Stewart. The Justices who sat on the newer 
cases were Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. 
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., 
Sonia M. Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Tuesday was chosen more or less at random, but it 
seemed that something was to be said for picking a day in the middle of the Court’s week, 
as opposed to one at the beginning or the end. It was not deemed feasible, for purposes of 
this study, to review all of the arguments given on every day for all six terms. 
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Terms.100 Our data set for 1958–60 consisted of 89.642 cases,101 while the data set 
for 2010–12 consisted of seventy-nine cases. We present our data as essentially two 
snapshots for two reasons. First, we have no reason to believe that Tuesday cases 
are not representative of their respective periods, but we also cannot prove that they 
are, since we have not studied all of the cases argued in all of the terms that we 
studied. Second, and probably more important, we have not endeavored to study any 
terms prior to the 1958–60 period, or, except for the 1980 term studied by Chief 
Justice Roberts,102 any terms between the 1958–60 and the 2010–12 periods. Thus, 
we cannot say whether the 1958–60 period is an aberration in terms of what preceded 
it or whether the differences between the two periods are the result of a trend or are 
simply differences between two periods. 
Our study approached the data from both quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives. First, we sought to compare what was going on in the two periods 
through the use of extremely simple quantitative metrics, such as the total number 
of words spoken by counsel and the Justices, respectively; the number of speaking 
                                                            
100 The 19581960 period was chosen in part because oral argument transcripts were 
readily available for most cases, which was not the case for some other periods. Transcripts 
were available for all but three Tuesday cases during the 19581960 period. Two of the 
casesMitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290 (1959), and The Monrosa v. Carbon 
Black Exp., Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959)were argued on March 3, 1959. The third 
caseUnited States v. States of La., Tex., Miss., Ala. & Fla., 363 U.S. 121 (1960)was an 
original jurisdiction case argued on October 13, 1959. Transcripts for all other cases for both 
periods were available through Oyez.org or Supremecourt.gov. Three significant differences 
between the two periods should be noted. First, the time allotted for oral argument in the 
earlier period was typically one hour to the side, as opposed to one-half hour to the side in 
the later period. Second, the Court was hearing oral argument for more hours each day and 
for more days each week in the earlier period. Third, because of the two hours allotted for 
oral argument in the earlier period, cases were often argued over a two-day period. In other 
words, some cases began on Monday and ended on Tuesday, while others began on Tuesday 
and ended on Wednesday. Our study included all cases fully or partially argued on Tuesdays, 
but counted the partially argued cases as fractional cases, according to the number of minutes 
that were argued on Tuesday. For example, if the Tuesday and Wednesday portions of the 
argument were each sixty minutes long, the case was included in our study as 0.5 cases. We 
recognized that there might be some distortion if, for example, the Tuesday portion of an 
argument were very brief, but we thought that including partial arguments of whatever length 
was less likely to distort the study than not including them. Thus, we chose to compare one 
day of arguments in the earlier period to one day of arguments in the later period. Consistent 
with the jurisdictional statutes in effect during the earlier period, the earlier cases also include 
a larger number of appeals. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 4, at 389, 39195 
(describing the process leading to the virtual elimination of mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction). 
101 The number of cases is not an integer because the Court’s daily call often included 
partial cases in the earlier period, as previously explained. See supra note 100 and 
accompanying text. 
102 Roberts, supra note 15, at 75. 
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turns of the Justices; the number of questions asked by the Justices; and the number 
of noninterrogatory statements made by the Justices. Second, we analyzed a number 
of oral argument transcripts from the relevant periods to look more closely at the 
structure of oral argument and the precise nature of the Justices’ interventions during 
each period. Finally, based on our qualitative and quantitative analyses, we 
considered what effects any changes in the Justices’ behavior might have had on the 
nature of oral argument and its role in the Court’s decisional process. While some 
previous studies have focused on various time frames and modes of comparison, our 
study is unique in its combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to 
understand what is happening in the interactions among the Justices, and between 
the Justices and counsel; how those interactions appear to be different from what 
they were a half century ago; and the possible significance of those differences for 
understanding the Court’s role in our constitutional system. 
The nature of oral argument in the more recent period appears to be 
significantly different from what it was in the 1958–60 period. Oral argument seems 
somewhat chaotic in the later cases, particularly compared with the more orderly 
arguments of the earlier period. Among other things, the current Justices are far more 
talkative than their predecessors. That may be the case because the Justices are better 
prepared (having more clerks and a smaller caseload) and therefore know more 
about each case, have had the opportunity to form an opinion as to the best outcome, 
and have a strong incentive to talk—despite the shortening by half of the time 
available for oral argument. But it is not easy to see what the Justices hope to achieve 
at oral argument.  
While the Justices have long used oral argument as an opportunity to speak to 
each other, the Justices’ extra-curial writings suggest that some may now consider 
this aspect of oral argument to be its predominant function.103 Alternatively, the 
evidence might be understood to suggest that the Justices sometimes seem to regard 
oral argument not as a serious or important part of the decisional process, but as an 
opportunity to demonstrate their quickness or cleverness, or as Professor Epstein 
and her colleagues have said, to have “a good time.”104 In the older cases, the Justices 
appeared to give counsel more leeway in developing their own narratives and in 
responding to the Justices’ concerns. Although substantial parts of the earlier oral 
arguments may have taken on the character of monologues, the interactions that did 
occur seemed more like conversations between counsel and the Court, whereby 
precedents were examined, theories tested, and legal and factual points clarified. To 
be sure, the Justices asked questions, made points to their colleagues, and 
emphasized lines of argument they found particularly weak or persuasive, but they 
also seemed more cognizant that there were other purposes to be served at oral 
argument: allowing counsel to craft a narrative and emphasize the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the parties’ positions; providing counsel with an opportunity to 
make his best case, face to face, to the Court; assuring the parties that their concerns 
were being fairly and thoroughly considered; and providing the public with an 
                                                            
103 See supra note 63. 
104 EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 314. 
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opportunity, not simply to learn what was at stake in the case, but to see that justice 
was done. To the extent one can tell, the Justices seemed more likely to ask questions 
to which they truly desired answers, and they generally gave counsel a reasonable 
opportunity to answer their questions. Perhaps consistent with the mores of the 
period, the Justices generally did not appear to be sarcastic or rude toward counsel.  
The more recent arguments suggest a different dynamic. The Justices showed 
little interest in having counsel develop even the outlines of a coherent narrative, 
and they rarely allowed counsel to do so. On the other hand, they frequently used an 
advocate’s limited time to joke or argue with each other. They sometimes seemed 
sarcastic or rude to counsel, and their behavior occasionally would qualify as 
bullying if it occurred in a different context. The Justices were better prepared and 
seemed more personally invested—perhaps too personally invested—in individual 
cases.  
Various explanations for these differences are possible, and more than one 
explanation may be necessary to account for all of them. One possible explanation 
for the seemingly increased emphasis on oral argument as a venue for persuading 
one’s colleagues is that the Justices may now see interactions at oral argument as a 
substitute for the deliberation or discussion that could occur in a post-argument 
conference, but apparently does not. The Justices’ occasional sarcasm and rudeness 
may be related to the more general coarsening of social interactions in our society 
or to an increased level of intellectual elitism—which might also explain the levity 
with which some of the Justices sometimes seem to approach some of the issues or 
factual backgrounds of a case. It may also be that the Justices’ conduct at oral 
argument reflects their sense that oral argument no longer serves any real purpose in 
most cases, but is a practice that cannot be eliminated for political reasons.105 In this 
sense, the explanation for the Justices’ conduct at oral argument may simply be 
boredom. In any event, the “new oral argument” is not about the lawyers, who often 
seem to be props, bystanders, or straight men in the well of the Court. Nor is it about 
the parties or the public. What goes on at oral argument is often incomprehensible 
to the public. Oral argument seems to be for and about the Justices.  
  
                                                            
105 Oral argument is dear to the hearts of most lawyers. For both the public and the 
profession, oral argument provides an assurance that the issues presented will actually be 
considered by those who have the power to decide them. Oral argument is therefore symbolic 
of the promise that justice will not only be done, but be seen to be done. See Roberts, supra 
note 15, at 69 (agreeing with Justice Harlan’s view that “your oral argument on appeal is 
perhaps the most effective weapon you have got”). 
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IV.  OUR QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
 
We reviewed all available transcripts for Tuesday arguments for both periods: 
October Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12.106 For each case in our sample, we first 
attempted to determine the precise number of words spoken by counsel and the 
Court, respectively.107 That step was straightforward in most cases. In some cases, 
however, the court reporter recorded some counsel statements or judicial 
interventions as “Inaudible.” In such cases, we relied on the oral argument tapes to 
estimate the number of words included in the “inaudible” statement or 
intervention.108 With respect to the Justices’ participation, we counted three 
additional variables: speaking turns, questions, and statements. By “speaking turn,” 
we mean every occasion on which a Justice spoke, either without interruption or 
before being interrupted, whether for one word or several hundred. We used the term 
“question” to refer to any utterance by a Justice that ended in a question mark or 
otherwise manifested an interrogatory intent by using words such as “I’d like to 
know whether . . . .”109 We used the term “statement” to mean any utterance that was 
                                                            
106 As previously noted, we were unable to locate transcripts for three Tuesday cases 
during the earlier period. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
107 We created Microsoft Word documents from each original transcript and used the 
program’s word-counting function to calculate word totals, which we did by highlighting 
sections of uninterrupted text spoken by counsel or by one of the Justices, respectively. We 
refined the data by subtracting the number of words in the speaker’s name, the number of 
nonword characters that Microsoft Word conventionally counts as words (such as double 
dashes standing alone or at the beginning of words), and a number of other nonwords that 
the program counts as words (such as the expression “(ph)” used to signify phonetic 
spelling). We also excluded such ceremonial expressions as “Mr. Chief Justice, and May it 
please the Court” and “Thank you, counsel. The case is submitted.” Since we mainly limited 
our study to transcripts, our results are limited in the same way that transcripts are limited. 
For example, when two Justices speak at the same time, the reporter necessarily records one 
and then the other. Thus, virtually simultaneous interventions may appear as interruptions. 
While that fact may distort the data in an absolute sense, we have no reason to believe that it 
does so disproportionately for one or the other period, except insofar as the Justices generally 
spoke more in the later cases. 
108 To approximate the “word value” of dialogue that the court reporter recorded as 
“(Inaudible),” we first tracked the number of times that the word “Inaudible” appeared in 
each transcript, counting separately for Justices (“JI”) and counsel (“CI”). We then estimated 
an approximate word value for each JI and CI by listening to the relevant oral argument 
recordings. Certain Justices, including Justices Brennan, Clark, and Whittaker, were often 
difficult to hear and sometimes were responsible for relatively lengthy periods of inaudible 
material. That problem was not present in the newer cases.  
109 We encountered relatively few instances in which the Justices asked questions in 
that form. 
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declaratory rather than interrogatory in form.110 For each case, we recorded Justice 
words (“JW”), counsel words (“CW”), the ratio of JW to CW (“R”),111 speaking 
turns by Justices (“ST”), questions by the Justices (“Q”), statements by the Justices 
(“S”), and the ratio of Justice statements to Justice questions (“S:Q”). 
As our study developed, we noticed significant structural differences between 
the older and newer oral arguments that suggested the need for developing certain 
additional metrics. First, we noticed that the Justices in the older cases allowed 
counsel considerably more time for introductory remarks before they interrupted. To 
capture this difference quantitatively, we recorded the number of words in the 
opening statement that each lawyer gave prior to the Court’s first interruption 
(“O”).112 Second, in both sets of cases, the Justices and counsel engaged in back-
and-forth conversation with nearly equal JW and CW. In the older cases, however, 
the Justices frequently allowed counsel to deliver long non-opening monologues. 
We therefore decided to record the longest non-opening monologue for each lawyer 
(“Longest non-O CW (counsel)”). We also decided to record all non-opening 
                                                            
110 The fact that some of the Justices’ utterances were recorded as “(Inaudible),” i.e., 
“JI,” introduced an additional complication: if the court reporter recorded either the entirety 
or the end of a Justice’s speaking turn as inaudible, should the speaking turn be considered 
to end with a question or a statement? In many cases, context resolved the issue: an inaudible 
intervention was treated as a question if the beginning of the relevant sentence was audible 
and clearly indicated a question (“Who appeared at the deposition to (Inaudible),” or, 
alternatively, an audible response clearly appeared to answer a question (“No, these goods 
were intrastate, your honor.”). Otherwise, we treated such speaking turns as ending with a 
statement, rather than a question. That default rule was chosen for two reasons. First, 
statements outnumbered questions in every Term, making it more likely than not that any 
individual inaudible utterance was a statement. Second, our working hypothesis was that the 
Justices spoke more declaratively—defined by a higher ratio S for each Q—in the newer 
cases. Since JI occurred more in the older cases, counting JI as statements increased the ratio 
of S to Q more significantly in those older cases. This would decrease the change in the S to 
Q ratio and guard against artificially inflating the data to support our hypothesis. Also, as 
previously noted, we did not note the identity of individual Justices. We considered words, 
speaking turns, and other metrics on a Court-wide level only. 
111 A higher R value signifies greater activity by the Justices. For example, an R of 0.5 
indicates that the Justices spoke half the words that counsel spoke; an R of 1.0 indicates an 
equal number of words; and so on. 
112 We recorded this data for each of the arguments in a case: petitioner’s opening 
argument, respondent’s argument, and petitioner’s reply, if any. In some cases, there may 
also have been an argument by an amicus curiae (usually the Solicitor General), which was 
also included. In the older cases, counsel sometimes “started” their arguments twice, because 
the Court had risen for a midday break or adjourned for the day in the middle of the argument. 
We treated those “secondary openings” differently, depending on whether they occurred 
after a midday or overnight break. We thought that an overnight break was a sufficiently 
long interruption in the argument to warrant treating the beginning of the argument that 
began the second day as akin to an “opening,” whereas it seemed reasonable to assume that 
the resumption of an argument after a midday break should simply be treated as a resumption 
of the argument.  
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counsel monologues that were 200 words or longer.113 As we continued to analyze 
the data, however, we determined that the 200-word benchmark did not capture the 
magnitude of the differences between the older and newer cases. We therefore 
decided to record all non-opening counsel monologues that were at least 50, 100, 
200, and 500 words.114 We also decided to record and compare the longest non-
opening monologues (“Longest non-O CW (case)”) for each case.115 
Finally, we noticed that the Justices and counsel seemed to interrupt and “cross 
talk” each other more often116—and therefore had significantly more one-word or 
two-word speaking turns—in the older cases. To capture the reality of these 
exchanges more precisely (and to facilitate a more meaningful comparison between 
the older and newer cases), we decided that we needed a more precise metric and 
eventually settled on recording three different categories of speaking turn.117 Thus, 
we distinguished between speaking turns in which a Justice was able to utter at least 
                                                            
113 Various sources estimate that the average rate of speech for public speaking is 
approximately 125 words per minute. See JO SPRAGUE ET AL., THE SPEAKER’S HANDBOOK 
72 (2014); MICHAEL OSBORN ET AL., PUBLIC SPEAKING: FINDING YOUR VOICE 257 (9th ed. 
2011); RUTH LIVINGSTON, ADVANCED PUBLIC SPEAKING: DYNAMICS AND TECHNIQUES 
(2015). However, it seems clear from the total number of words spoken in the earlier and 
later cases, respectively, that the participants were speaking somewhat more quickly in the 
later cases. See infra notes 121–123 and accompanying text. 
114 To capture more precisely the reality of the newer cases, we separately recorded all 
instances in which counsel spoke for fifty words or more and for one hundred words or more. 
We did so because counsel in the newer cases often spoke for two or three brief paragraphs—
a sufficient number of words to warrant being tracked, without reaching the two-hundred-
word threshold. We also decided to record all instances in which counsel spoke for five 
hundred words or more, since that often happened in the older cases, while counsel in the 
newer cases rarely reached two hundred words. Monologues in the earlier cases sometimes 
reached or exceeded one thousand words, but not often enough to warrant a separate 
category. We therefore recorded and analyzed four categories of CW length—50, 100, 200, 
and 500 words. The categories were overlapping in the sense that a 135-word monologue 
would be included in both the 50-or-more words category and the 100-or-more words 
category; a 760-word monologue would count in all four categories. Assuming that the 
normal rate of speech is 125 words per minute, a normal speaker would speak 50 words in 
24 seconds, 100 words in forty-eight seconds, 150 words in one minute and twelve seconds, 
and 500 words in four minutes. 
115 Thus, if petitioner’s longest non-opening monologue was three hundred words in his 
initial argument, respondent’s was five hundred words in his responsive argument, and 
petitioner’s was six hundred words in his rebuttal, the value attributed to the case for this 
metric would be six hundred words.  
116 Unlike the later cases, the Justices only rarely interrupted each other in the earlier 
cases. 
117 We initially considered recording the number of “colloquies” between counsel and 
the Court, meaning extended conversations between counsel and a single Justice, but we 
rejected that approach because a random sampling of cases showed that colloquies occurred 
with similar frequency in both time periods. We use examples of colloquies in the qualitative 
part of our study.  
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one full sentence (ST(f)) from those in which he or she did not do so (ST(p)), 
regardless of the precise number of words uttered. We refer to the sum of ST(p) and 
ST(f) as ST(t).118 We also measured the average number of words the Justices uttered 
per speaking turn (JW/ST(t)).119 The data relating to speaking turns is described by 
reference to these terms and set forth in the tables.120 
 
V.  OUR QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
Application of these metrics to the cases in our data set confirmed the existence 
of several significant differences between the earlier and later cases with respect to 
the oral argument behavior of the Justices. These differences include an increase in 
the average number of words spoken by the Justices in the later cases; a substantial 
increase in the percentage of words spoken by the Justices (compared with the 
percentage of words spoken by counsel) in the later cases; a higher average ratio of 
Justice statements to questions in the later cases; an almost doubling of the average 
number of words the Justices spoke during each separate speaking turn; and a 
dramatic shortening of the longest opening and non-opening monologues by counsel 
in the later cases.121 
                                                            
118 We were concerned that referring to each one-word or two-word utterance as a 
“speaking turn” might distort any comparison with the later arguments, which contained less 
“cross talk” of that kind. Using the categories of ST(p), ST(f), and ST(t) permitted a greater 
degree of consistency, so that ST(f) would not change, regardless of how a colloquy had been 
transcribed. For example, if a Justice said, “This issue has been litigated before in several 
state courts,” this ten-word sentence would represent one ST(f), as well as one ST(t). If 
counsel interrupted a Justice’s question or statement, however, that could be done in a 
number of ways (consistent with the number of words in the interrupted sentence), so that 
the transcript might split a single ten-word sentence into two parts, four parts, or even nine 
parts. But the ST(f) total would remain at one. Unlike ST(p) and ST(t), ST(f) would provide 
a reliable variable for a (Q + S) / ST calculation. 
119 We used ST(t) rather than ST(f) because many ST(p)s were quite wordy. To use 
ST(f) would skew the results by excluding these wordy ST(p)s. 
120 See Appendices A, B, and C. 
121 These differences are reflected in word count spreadsheets available at 
http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. Comparisons between the 
two periods are reflected in Tables 1, 2, and 3, represented in Appendices A, B, and C. 
Having tested the data reflected in Tables 1 and 2 to determine whether the differences 
between the periods (October Terms 1958, 1959, and 1960 vs. October Terms 2010, 2011, 
and 2012) were statistically significant, rather than simply the result of random chance or 
selection bias, we concluded that the differences were statistically significant. We performed 
a two sample t-test using Stata Version 13.1. We evaluated each variable by testing its value 
by the era in which the case was argued (i.e., October Terms 1958, 1959, and 1960 vs. 
October Terms 2010, 2011, and 2012), using a sample of 197 observations and a 95% 
confidence level. This number of observations reflects the total number of arguments (partial 
and full) that were included in the count for October Terms 1958, 1959, and 1960; the number 
of cases for that period, by contrast, aggregates partial arguments, so that the total number 
2015] ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 1043 
The first notable difference concerned the quantity of words spoken by the 
Justices and counsel, respectively, per case. Although the Court reduced by half the 
time allotted for oral argument (from a default rule of one hour to one-half hour to 
the side in each case), the Justices increased their total words per case by 23.7%.122 
At the same time, the average words spoken by counsel in each case decreased by 
45.8%.123 The fact that the Justices currently dominate oral argument to a much 
greater degree than they did previously was also illustrated by a significant change 
in the ratio of words spoken by the Justices to words spoken by counsel (“R”): the 
older cases saw an R of 0.275, while the newer cases’ R was 0.627.124 The ratio of 
                                                            
of cases is smaller than the number of observations. This number of observations was chosen 
because of the inability to analyze statistically the integer use in t-testing without introducing 
uncertain biases or changes to the data. The testing or null hypothesis was “the difference 
between the two groups is not statistically significant.” With respect to all cited variables 
tested, the null hypothesis was rejected. The other quantitative data about which we report 
were not tested for significance because of experiment design and the determination that 
significance testing would not be meaningful. See Appendices A, B, and C (Tables 1, 2, and 
3). In Table 4, which is available at http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/ 
1564/1229, we show the results of our study of October Term 1980, which confirm the 
accuracy of Chief Justice’s observation concerning the apparent lack of change between his 
two data points.  
122 On average, the Justices spoke 3,952.962 words per case in the newer cases, over 
700 words higher than the 3,195.699 words per case they spoke in the older cases. Two points 
warrant emphasis here. First, the Court spent somewhat more time hearing oral arguments 
each day in the earlier period than it did in the later period. That is why our sample includes 
a total of 89.642 cases for the earlier cases, but only 79 cases for the later period, even though 
the time allotted for argument was generally twice as long in the earlier period than in the 
later period. Second, the time allowed for argument in the later cases was less in the later 
period. The fact that the Justices actually increased their words per case by nearly 25% during 
the later period is all the more remarkable because the time allotted for argument in the later 
cases was only half that available in the earlier cases. Given the differences in the number of 
cases heard each day and the number of minutes of argument time allocated to each case, the 
most significant data point is not the raw number of Justice words, but the ratio of Justice 
words to lawyer words. While one might have expected that the ratio of Justice words to 
lawyer words would have remained constant between the two periods, that was not the case. 
Presumably, the Justices currently have more to say than they could possibly say if they acted 
according to the older ratio, given the shorter period of time that is now generally allowed 
for the argument of each case.  
123 On average, counsel spoke 6,300.722 words per case in the newer cases, over 5,000 
words fewer than the 11,614.445 they spoke in the older cases. With half the time available 
for oral argument in the newer cases, counsel spoke slightly more words per minute of 
argument time in the newer cases, but, again, because of the Court’s shortening of oral 
argument time, their words per case dropped significantly. See Table 1, Appendix A. 
124 In the older cases, the Justices spoke 286,470.23 words while counsel spoke 
1,041,846 words for a ratio of 0.275. (The methodology used to estimate the number of 
inaudible words is responsible for the fact that the Justices’ word total is not a whole number. 
To estimate the number of words contained in inaudible sections, we sampled twenty-one of 
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the newer cases’ R to the older cases’ R is 2.280. In other words, for a constant 
number of counsel words, the Justices in the newer cases spoke twenty-two words 
for every ten that the Justices spoke in the earlier cases. Measured purely by words, 
the current Justices are 2.280 times more talkative than their predecessors.  
An analysis of the Justices’ speaking turns shows further differences. In the 
older cases, the ratio of statements to questions was 1.478,125 which rose to 1.907126 
in the newer cases—an increase of 29.026%. This rise confirms the common 
perception that the Justices are asking fewer questions and making more declarative 
statements or pronouncements. Table 2127 illustrates the change between the earlier 
and later cases: the number of statements has increased, the number of questions has 
decreased, and the ratio of the first to the second has increased substantially. In 
addition, the completed sentences per full speaking turn increased 73.8%.128 Finally, 
and perhaps most dramatically, the average Justice words per speaking turn 
increased 92.9%.129 Therefore, looking at oral arguments on a per-speaking-turn 
basis, it is clear that the current Justices are more declarative (as opposed to 
interrogatory) and more talkative during each speaking turn—facts that would be 
missed by merely counting questions. 
The quantitative data also show dramatic differences between earlier and later 
cases in the incidence and length of relatively long monologues by counsel. The 
number of words spoken in the average opening monologue in the newer cases was 
just 30.6% of the average number spoken in the older cases.130 The difference for 
non-opening monologues was also dramatic, with the average number of words 
spoken in the longest monologue by each lawyer in the older cases being 2.857 times 
greater than the average in the newer cases.131 In other words, taking each lawyer’s 
longest non-opening monologue and averaging the longest monologues for both the 
                                                            
the eighty-nine older cases, listened to the tapes for each of those cases, estimated the number 
of words in each inaudible segment of each tape, added up the total number of words 
estimated for all the inaudible segments for each tape, and then divided the total number of 
words contained in all inaudible segments of each tape by the number of inaudible segments.) 
That gave us an average number of words for inaudible segments for each tape. We did the 
same for all tapes and then averaged the length in words of the inaudible segments for all 
tapes. That gave us a number that we could apply to the inaudible segments of the 
nonsampled cases, which ultimately produced some fractions. In the newer cases, the Justices 
spoke 312,284 words while counsel spoke 497,757 words for a ratio of 0.627.  
125 In the older cases, the Justices made 9,990 statements and asked 6,758 questions. 
126 In the newer cases, the Justices made 12,227 statements and asked 6,410 questions. 
127 See Table 2, Appendix B. 
128 The older cases saw 1.288 completed sentences in each full speaking turn, while the 
newer cases saw 2.239 completed sentences in each full speaking turn. 
129 In the older cases, the Justices averaged 18.231 words in each speaking turn. In the 
newer cases, however, the Justices averaged 35.163 words per speaking turn.  
130 In the newer cases, the average opening monologue was 135.222 words. In the older 
cases, the average opening monologue was 441.634 words. 
131 In the older cases, the average longest monologue by counsel was 727.282 words; 
in the newer cases, the average was 254.518 words. 
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older and the newer cases, the longest monologues in the older cases contained 
nearly three times as many words as those in the newer cases. An analysis that 
considers only the longest monologue in each case tells the same story: for the older 
cases, the average length of the longest monologue in each case was 2.849 times 
greater than for the newer cases.132 Table 3 compares these three measures.133  
Whether one measures the total words that the Justices and counsel speak 
during each oral argument, the ratio of statements to questions found in the Justices’ 
interventions during oral argument, or the incidence and length of counsel 
monologues, the data show that the Justices were far more active during the newer 
cases. 
 
VI.  OUR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
For the qualitative part of our study, we examined more closely a number of 
transcripts from cases in our data sets. These transcripts were not randomly selected, 
but were chosen because they provided concrete examples of the qualities we 
observed quantitatively in the two sets of cases and were particularly interesting 
from the viewpoint of argument structure or the precise nature of the Justices’ 
interventions. Our qualitative comparison of the two sets of transcripts confirmed 
the existence of significant differences between the older and newer cases. First, the 
Justices in the older cases typically permitted counsel to make a long opening 
statement. Usually, a Justice would then ask a question or make a statement 
containing relatively few words,134 at which point counsel would speak again, 
responding to the Justice’s observation or question and beginning another long 
monologue that typically lasted for several hundred words. During the balance of 
the argument, the Justices in the older cases tended to allow longer monologues and 
interrupted counsel only sporadically. Finally, the Justices in the older cases engaged 
in extended, inquisitive colloquies with counsel, apparently endeavoring to firm up 
their own understanding of the operative facts, rules, and arguments in each case. 
By contrast, the Justices in the newer cases interrupted early, often, and directly. 
Sometimes they did so to clarify an argument. Often they spoke strategically, with 
the fairly obvious intention of influencing colleagues by bolstering (or deflating) 
certain arguments. Not infrequently, they interrupted and talked over each other, 
indicating the degree to which they valued oral argument as an opportunity to speak. 
Finally, the Justices in the newer cases simply spoke more—sometimes much more, 
dominating some arguments in the process. These features of the “new oral 
argument” suggest that oral argument is very different from what it was in the not-
too-distant past and signal that the current Justices may well have very different 
attitudes toward oral argument than did their predecessors. Whether the Court has 
                                                            
132 In the older cases, the average of the longest monologues in each case was 1042.267 
words; in the newer cases, the average of that same measurement was 365.861 words. 
133 See Table 3, Appendix C. 
134 Alternatively, a Justice and counsel might engage in a brief colloquy at that time. 
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any shared, coherent theory as to the purpose or aims of oral argument is another 
matter.  
 
A.  Oral Argument in the 1958–60 Period 
 
1.  The Opening Monologue and the Structure of the Argument 
 
Although the precise structure of oral argument naturally varied among the 
older cases, a general pattern emerged. Counsel typically opened with a lengthy 
statement of the case, usually exceeding three hundred words.135 One of the Justices 
would eventually interrupt counsel with a question or comment.136 Counsel would 
then typically respond to the question and begin another long monologue—also 
usually well over three hundred words—either immediately or after a brief 
colloquy.137 The structure of counsel’s argument would thereafter vary considerably 
from case to case, but, in virtually all cases, counsel would have had an opportunity 
at the outset to establish the foundation for his or her argument.138 
                                                            
135 See http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. 
136 Id. 
137 Typically, counsel would set forth the factual background of the case before being 
interrupted by a Justice’s question or observation. The advocate would then respond to the 
question or observation, often engaging in a monologue that explained his position and 
reasoning. These colloquies tended to elucidate the Justices’ doubts and reservations about 
counsel’s arguments and allowed counsel to address those concerns. 
138 In the earlier period, the Justices heard more hours of oral argument each week. In 
1954, Stern and Gressman advised, “Arguments are heard from Monday through Friday, 
from noon to 2 PM, and from 2:30 PM to 4:30 PM.” ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE 
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE, ARGUING AND 
BRIEFING TECHNIQUES, FORMS, STATUTES, RULES FOR PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 320 (2d ed. 1954). That practice changed in June 1955, when the Court 
moved to a four-day-per-week hearing schedule. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 129. 
Thus, during the period under review, the Court heard oral arguments from 10 a.m. to noon, 
and from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. on Monday through Thursday, reserving Friday for the 
conference. See ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: 
JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE, ARGUING AND BRIEFING TECHNIQUES, FORMS, STATUTES, 
RULES FOR PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 354 (3d ed. 1962). 
Previously, when the Court heard arguments on Monday through Friday, the conference was 
held on Saturday. Id. Since the Justices spent more time in Court, they presumably had less 
time to study the briefs and case materials before oral argument. They also had fewer law 
clerks to assist them, had more opinions to write, and may have spent more of their own time 
drafting opinions. The long monologues in the earlier cases may have substituted for some 
part of the Justices’ independent study of the case materials, while they also allowed counsel 
(particularly in the opening monologues) to construct a compelling factual and theoretical 
framework in which to situate their argument.  
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The 1959 oral argument in Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School 
District,139 an appeal from the Supreme Court of Texas, is typical of the older cases. 
Phillips challenged the constitutionality of a Texas statute authorizing the state’s 
taxation of property owned by the federal government, but leased to a private 
entity.140 Clark M. Clifford, the well-known Washington lawyer141 who represented 
Phillips, opened with a 439-word monologue.142 He began by identifying the parties, 
noted that both the United States and the State of Texas had “intervened” as amici 
curiae, and called attention to the relevant Texas statute, which has “to do with the 
taxing of lessees of federal property.”143 Clifford then described the salient facts, 
which were “simple and undisputed”:  
 
During World War II, the Federal Government built an ordnance plant in 
Moore County, Texas and called it the Cactus Ordnance Works. It 
operated during the war and made explosives there. After the war was 
over, the Government did not wish to sell the plant, they wanted to keep 
it in the ownership of the Federal Government in the event that at some 
future time they might wish to use it again. So they leased the plant. And 
in 1948, the Federal Government, which owned the fee of the plant, leased 
the plant to Phillips Chemical Company for a primary period of 15 years 
with right of renewal. The rental on the plant was in excess of $1 million 
per year. Also, the Government can cancel the lease at anytime that it 
chooses on giving 90 days notice. If it desires to sell the plant, the 
Government can also cancel a lease on 30 days notice in the event of a 
national emergency. Now in 1950, the Legislature of Texas passed a law 
that United States property would be subject to taxation if used by a 
private party in its business. Now from 1950 to 1954, nothing occurred. 
Everybody went along in their usual manner. But in 1954, the School 
District, I’ll refer to it as that, levied a tax against Phillips based on the 
full fee value of the Cactus Ordnance Works. Phillips was operating the 
plant as an anhydrous ammonia plant which, as Your Honors know, is 
used in commercial fertilizer. Now after the assessor assessed that tax 
against Phillips based on the full fee value of the plant, Phillips filed suit 
in the state court in Texas to have the assessment cancelled and to enjoin 
                                                            
139 361 U.S. 376 (1960). The case was argued on Nov. 17–18, 1959. Id. at 376.  
140 Id. at 377–81. 
141 See, e.g., JOHN ACACIA, CLARK CLIFFORD: THE WISE MAN OF WASHINGTON 168 
(2009); CLARK CLIFFORD, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR 262, 268 (1991). 
142 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1–2, Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. School 
Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960) (No. 40), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-
1959/1959/1959_40#argument-1 (last visited June 14, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/38PY-27D2; see http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564 
/1229. 
143 Id. at 1. 
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the collector from collecting the tax. The lower court denied relief as did 
the Intermediate Court of Civil Appeals.144 
 
Justice Harlan interrupted: “What if they didn’t know what (Inaudible)?”145 Clifford 
responded to the question and continued with his argument, speaking without 
interruption for an additional 485 words: 
 
We do not know, Your Honor. No explanation appears to that -- of that, 
as far as I know none appears in the record. The case then after going from 
the Court of Civil Appeals went to the Supreme Court of Texas. There the 
validity of the statute was upheld, but at that time, out of the nine judges 
of that Court, four dissented strenuously and they dissented on the ground 
that this statute was flagrantly, grossly discriminatory insofar as the 
Federal Government and its lessees are concerned. Now briefly . . . 
Phillips showed in the trial below that lessees of nonfederal exempt 
property paid no tax at all if the lease was for under three years. And they 
paid the tax based only on the leasehold if the term of the lease was for 
more than three years. So Phillips said in view of what the other lessees 
of tax-exempt property were -- were subjected to in Texas that it was 
invalid and unconstitutional for the legislature to select just the lessees of 
federal property and subject them to a tax based on the full fee value of 
the property which they were leasing. We present but two questions here. 
One, the 1950 Texas law is invalid for it is repugnant to the Constitution 
of the United States. It discriminates against the United States and those 
with whom it deals. It imposes a burden on the activities of the Federal 
Government and infringes upon its sovereignty. It also violates the Due 
Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
That is our first point. Our second point is the law is invalid for it imposes 
an ad valorem tax upon the federal property and interferes with the 
sovereign right of the Government over its property in Texas. Now the 
argument if you please and I address myself solely to the point number 
one. Simply point number one is the tax is discriminatory. Now we must 
refer, if Your Honors will please, to the statute in question or it will be 
referred to a good many times in the course of the argument. I refer you 
to page 12 of the appellant’s brief. Briefly it will be noted, it says in 
substance to this. “The United States shall be secure in their possession 
and enjoyment of all lands acquired under the provisions of this type, and 
such lands and all improvements thereon should be exempt from any 
taxation under the authority of the state so long as the same are held, 
owned, used, and occupied by the United States for the purposes 
expressed in this title and not otherwise.” Let me stop and say that down 
                                                            
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 2.  
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to this point that had been in the law of Texas for many years. But in 1950, 
the Legislature of Texas amended it to add the following language which 
appears in -- on the page 12.146 
 
Patterson v. United States,147 which was argued in April 1959, also illustrates 
the general pattern. That case involved the remedies available to civilian employees 
injured on government-owned merchant vessels.148 Jacob Rassner, an experienced 
maritime employment lawyer,149 began with a 334-word opening statement.150 
Justice Frankfurter then asked a question,151 to which Rassner responded with an 
889-word monologue, briefly answering the question and then addressing the history 
of the Shipping Act and its application from 1916 until 1959.152 A lively back-and-
forth between Mr. Rassner and Justices Frankfurter and Stewart followed.153  
Similarly, in Monroe v. Pape,154 the landmark civil rights case holding that 
individual police officers, but not municipal corporations,155 were amenable to suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Sydney R. Drebin, an assistant Chicago corporation 
counsel, opened his argument for the respondents with a 901-word monologue.156 
At that point, Justices Frankfurter and Douglas briefly interrupted him,157 correcting 
                                                            
146 Id. 
147 359 U.S. 495 (1959). The case was argued on Apr. 21, 1959. Id. at 495. 
148 Id. 
149 See, e.g., Ben F. Small, Workmen’s Compensation, Railroad and Admiralty Law, 3 
OKLA. L. REV. 369, 371–72 (1950) (reviewing the Nat’l Ass’n of Claimant’s Comp. Att’ys, 
NACCA Law Journal 368 (1949)). 
150 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959) 
(No. 429), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_429 (last visited 
June 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B2MJ-82C3; see http://epubs.utah.edu/index. 
php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1–3. 
153 Id. at 3–5. 
154 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The case was argued on Nov. 8, 1960. Id. at 167. 
155 The Court partially overruled Monroe in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 
436 U.S. 658 (1978), which held that municipal corporations were also amenable to suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 658–59. 
156 Transcript of Oral Argument Part 2 at 13–15, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) 
(No. 39), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_39#argument (last 
visited June 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PSG7-CVEW; see 
http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. 
157 Id. at 15. Here, as in United States v. Louisiana, the Justices were not interrupting 
with substantive questions. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. They were 
simply correcting counsel, who misattributed the authorship of an opinion. In addition, 
Justice Douglas used the occasion to inject some levity into the proceeding.  
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Drebin’s account of the Court’s holding in Screws v. United States.158 Drebin then 
spoke for an additional 848 words without interruption.159 
Three cases provide even more extreme examples. In Carpenters Local v. 
NLRB,160 a case involving a union dues refund remedy, Bernard Dunau, a highly 
regarded labor lawyer,161 opened with a statement exceeding 2,250 words.162 After 
a brief question from Justice Harlan,163 Dunau spoke without further interruption for 
another 873 words.164 Similarly, in United States v. Louisiana,165 an original action 
involving the ownership of certain natural resources in the Gulf of Mexico, James 
P. Hart, Texas’s lawyer, opened with a 1,321-word monologue.166 Justices Black 
and Harlan then asked a couple of brief questions before Hart resumed with a 417-
word monologue.167 Finally, in Callanan v. United States,168 a Hobbs Act case 
concerning the permissibility of consecutive criminal sentences, Morris A. Shenker, 
                                                            
158 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
159 Transcript of Oral Argument, Monroe v. Pape, supra note 156 at 15–17; see 
http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. 
160 365 U.S. 651 (1961). The case was argued on Feb. 28, and Mar. 1, 1961. Id. at 651. 
161 Dunau’s death was marked by both the Harvard Law Review and the Virginia Law 
Review. See generally Norton J. Come, Bernard Dunau: A Friend’s Tribute, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1349, 1350 (1975); Harold Leventhal, Bernard Dunau: A Judicial Appreciation, 62 
VA. L. REV. 469, 469 (1976). In his tribute to Professor Dunau, Judge Leventhal wrote that, 
“[h]e was a rare species, a free-lance specialist to whom union house counsel and trial 
lawyers could turn to handle appeals before the courts of appeals and Supreme Court . . . . 
[He] not only won cases, but his frequent appearances before the Supreme Court helped to 
shape the development of labor law.” Id. 
162 Transcript of Oral Argument Part 1 at 1–4, Carpenters Local v. Labor Bd, 365 U.S. 
651 (1961) (No. 68), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_68# 
argument (last visited Aug. 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/NU42-NBU9; see 
http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. 
163 Harlan asked: “Do they allow proof to find it there?” Transcript of Oral Argument, 
Carpenters Local v. Labor Bd., supra note 161, at 4. 
164 Id. at 4–6. 
165 363 U.S. 1 (1960). The case was argued on Oct. 12–15, 1959. Id. at 1. 
166 Transcript of Oral Argument Part 3 at 9–11, United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 
(1960) (No. 10 ORIG), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_10_ 
orig#argument (last visited Aug. 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/33VE-VMA2; see 
http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. In this part of his 
argument, Hart addressed various aspects of the relevant history, including President 
Jefferson’s correspondence concerning the Louisiana Purchase as well as certain relevant 
facts surrounding the annexation of Texas. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. 
Louisiana, supra note 165. This “opening” was not the first time that Hart spoke in United 
States v. Louisiana. The case went on for several days and Hart had presented argument on 
behalf of all the Gulf State respondents the day before, but this was the beginning of his 
argument for the day in question and the beginning of his argument for Texas as an individual 
party. 
167 Id. at 12–13. 
168 364 U.S. 587 (1961). The case was argued on Nov. 15–16, 1960. Id. at 587. 
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a St. Louis labor lawyer,169 delivered a 1,876-word opening monologue before the 
Court adjourned for the day.170 
 
2.  Long Non-Opening Monologues 
 
In addition to lengthy openings, the older cases include many examples of long, 
uninterrupted, non-opening monologues. For example, in Travis v. United States,171 
which involved a venue challenge in a criminal prosecution for filing an allegedly 
false “non-Communist affidavit”172 with the Labor Board, the defendant’s lawyer, 
Telford Taylor,173 spoke 302 words in his opening,174 was thereafter engaged in a 
brief colloquy by Justice Frankfurter,175 and then proceeded to give a non-opening 
monologue of 2,082 words, for just under seventeen minutes.176 Similarly, in Pan 
American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court,177 a case involving natural gas 
contracts, Byron Gray delivered a 1,584-word non-opening monologue,178 and in 
Maintenance Employees v. United States,179 there were five non-opening 
monologues that each exceeded 1,000 words.180 
                                                            
169 Id. at 587–88. 
170 Transcript of Oral Argument Part 1 at 1–3, Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 
(1961) (No. 47), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_47# 
argument (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); archived at http://perma.cc/H4SR-VFVL; see 
http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. 
171 364 U.S. 631, 631. The case was argued on December 13, 1960. 
172 Id. at 632. 
173 Taylor was a prominent lawyer and academic who served at Bletchley Park and on 
the Nuremberg prosecution team, achieving the rank of Brigadier General. Following Justice 
Jackson’s resignation, Taylor succeeded him as Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg. He was also 
well known for his representation of people accused of disloyalty during the McCarthy 
period. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A 
PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992); Peter Calvocoressi, A Personal Tribute, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 665, 665 (1999). 
174 Transcript of Oral Argument Part 1 at 1, Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961) 
(No. 10), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_10#argument (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5D6K-BLW8. 
175 Id. at 1–2. 
176 Id. at 2–5. The monologue is too long to reproduce here. Assuming an average 
speaking rate of 125 words per minute, a 2,082-word monologue would have lasted almost 
sixteen minutes and forty seconds. 
177 366 U.S. 656, 656 (1961). The case was argued on April 18, 1961. 
178 Transcript of Oral Argument Part 1 at 5–7, Pan Am. Petroleum Co. v. Superior 
Court, 366 U.S. 656 (1961) (No. 80), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-
1969/1960/1960_80#argument (last visited Aug. 17, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7C3N-9Y9A [hereinafter Pan Am. Petroleum Transcript]. Gray also 
delivered a 789-word opening monologue in that case. Id. at 1. 
179 366 U.S. 169, 169 (1961). The case was argued on March 28, 1961. 
180 William G. Mahoney opened with a 1,061-word opening, and later delivered two 
additional monologues of 1,594 words and 957 words, respectively. See Oral Argument Part 
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The most extreme case was United States v. Du Pont & Co.,181 a landmark case 
involving antitrust remedies. Hugh B. Cox, who represented DuPont, delivered a 
non-opening monologue of 2,839 words.182 Following a brief colloquy with Justice 
Stewart, Cox delivered a 1,553-word monologue.183 Robert L. Stern, a former First 
Assistant Solicitor General,184 followed Cox. Stern delivered his entire argument—
4,343 words—without interruption.185 
 
3.  The Relative Participation Rates of Court and Counsel in Older Cases 
 
As previously noted, the average R in the older cases was 0.275, meaning that 
the Justices, on average, spoke only 27.5 words for every hundred words spoken by 
counsel.186 That was much lower than the analogous R for the newer cases.187 In 
some older cases, however, the R was much lower still. For example, in United 
States v. Robinson,188 Beatrice Rosenberg and I. William Stempil each registered Rs 
                                                            
1 at 1–2, 10–14, Maint. Emps. v. United States, 366 U.S. 169 (1961) (No. 681), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_681#argument (last visited Aug. 17, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/D85A-T9NK. Solicitor General Cox followed; he 
delivered an 830-word opening monologue and two separate monologues of 1,066 words 
each. Id. at 15–16, 19–21; Part 2 at 1–3. Ralph L. McAfee followed, with one monologue 
encompassing 1,485 words. Id. at 6–8. Finally, Mahoney spoke for 1,083 words without 
interruption in his rebuttal. Id. at 9–11. 
181 366 U.S. 316, 316 (1961). The case was argued on February 20–21, 1961. 
182 Transcript of Oral Argument at Part 2 at 1–6, United States v. Du Pont & Co., 366 
U.S. 316 (1961) (No. 55), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-
1969/1960/1960_55#argument (last visited Aug. 17, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/35Q8-ENSP [hereinafter Du Pont Transcript]. He first addressed a 
distinction urged by the government, used his refutation of that distinction to defend the 
district court’s judgment, and then argued that Congress had not signaled any intention to 
limit the courts’ traditionally broad remedial powers in antitrust cases. Id. By implication, 
Cox was addressing himself to appellant’s argument that divestiture was a mandatory remedy 
at law. Id. He also addressed the question whether courts could fashion equitable remedies 
when an administrative agency had been established to resolve certain issues. Id. He then 
explained why divestiture, the government’s preferred remedy, might injure innocent 
stockholders. Id. 
183 Id. at 6–8. That monologue addressed the market effect of stock sales and then 
returned to the subject of equitable remedies. Id. 
184 Robert Stern, together with Eugene Gressman, wrote the original treatise on 
Supreme Court practice. See STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 138. 
185 Du Pont Transcript, supra note 182 at 8–15. Using the same 125 words-per-minute 
assumption, Stern spoke without interruption for just under thirty-five minutes. 
186 See supra note 123. 
187 Id. 
188 361 U.S. 220, 220 (1960). The case was argued on December 8, 1959; see Transcript 
of Oral Argument, United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960) (No. 16), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_16#argument (last visited Aug. 17, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZZH4-KQFZ. 
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less than 0.07, meaning that the Justices spoke fewer than seven words for every 
hundred that the lawyers spoke. Similarly, in United States v. Raines,189 the highest 
R for any attorney was 0.0325, meaning that the Justices spoke only slightly more 
than three words for every hundred that the lawyer spoke. In Pan American 
Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court,190 Byron Gray not only had a lengthy non-
opening monologue (as noted earlier), but an R of 0.0840. In Sam Daniels’s lengthy 
rebuttal in McNeal v. Culver,191 his R was only 0.00334, meaning that the Justices 
spoke just over three words for every thousand words that Daniels spoke.192 
In some of the older cases, the Court had relatively few questions for one side, 
but peppered the other. In Levine v. United States,193 for example, Myron L. Shapiro 
argued to a nearly silent Court, resulting in an R of 0.0228, while his opponent had 
an R of 0.362. In Sun Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n,194 Leo J. Hoffman had an R 
of 0.0367, while his opponent had an R of 0.244. Likewise, in United States v. 
Brosnan,195 Daniel M. Friedman196 found himself listening to the Justices almost as 
much as they listened to him: His R was 0.938, meaning that the Justices spoke over 
                                                            
189 362 U.S. 17 (1960). The case was argued on January 12, 1960; see Transcript of 
Oral Argument, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (No. 64). 
190 366 U.S. 656 (1961). The case was argued on April 18–19, 1961; see Pan. Am. 
Petroleum Transcript, supra note 178.  
191 365 U.S. 109 (1961). The case was argued on December 6, 1960. Id. at 109. See 
Oral Argument, McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (No. 52), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_52#argument, archived at http://perma. 
cc/X7CQ-6YAH. 
192 Daniels’s rebuttal was 1,498 words. The length of rebuttal arguments varies 
considerably, as do their R values. It is possible that the multi-day format contributed to lower 
R’s. For example, in Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960), which was argued on 
November 8, 1960, the Tuesday carry-over oral argument featured an R of only 0.0457. It 
may be that the Justices had asked all the questions they thought necessary at the Monday 
session or were simply looking forward to the end of the argument. 
193 362 U.S. 610 (1960). The case was argued on March 22, 1960. Id. at 610. See Oral 
Argument, Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960) (No. 164), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_164#argument, archived at http://perma. 
cc/7XEG-BLUK. 
194 364 U.S. 170 (1960). The case was argued on April 26, 1960. Id. at 170. See Oral 
Argument, Sun Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 364 U.S. 170 (1960) (No. 321), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_321#argument, archived at http://perma. 
cc/CGR8-YEW5. 
195 363 U.S. 237 (1960). The case was argued on March 21–22, 1960. Id. at 237. See 
Oral Argument, United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960) (No. 137), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_137#argument, archived at http://perma. 
cc/87QG-FU23. 
196 Friedman had a distinguished career as a government lawyer, Chief Judge of the 
Court of Claims, and United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit. See Biographical 
Directory of Federal Judges: Friedman, Daniel Mortimer, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2704&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited 
June 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2AM9-W25J. 
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ninety-three words for every hundred words he spoke.197 Friedman’s opponent, 
Samuel B. Stewart, registered Rs of 0.340 and 0.446 in his opening and rebuttal 
arguments.198  
 
4.  Colloquies 
 
Colloquies in the older cases typically featured one or more Justices who appear 
to have been trying to nail down points of importance. Whether the Justices pursued 
factual issues, tried to understand the nuances of counsel’s argument, or pressed 
counsel to distinguish a precedent, they tended to ask respectful and generally 
nonleading questions. Even when they expressed doubt or skepticism, the Justices 
typically did so respectfully, and they appear to have listened attentively to counsel’s 
response to their questions or observations.199  
For example, in Knetsch v. United States,200 a tax case involving a sham 
transaction devised solely for tax avoidance,201 Justice Harlan found certain aspects 
of the government’s argument puzzling: 
 
Justice Harlan: Do you disagree with his argument on that? I don’t want 
to go through the rigamarole of the -- because frankly I have -- in the 
lawsuit, right? But do you claim that he inevitably does get a tax benefit 
from this? 
Mr. Wiprud: He would if his -- the deductions were allowed, Your Honor 
but we say -- 
Justice Harlan: No, no. 
Mr. Wiprud: -- that they should not be allowed. 
Justice Harlan: I mean if these deductions were allowed? 
                                                            
197 See generally Oral Argument, supra note 194. 
198 Levine, Sun Oil, and Brosnan were all decided by a 5–4 vote. Interestingly, and 
contrary to what is now conventional wisdom, see Roberts, supra note 15, at 75, the winning 
party in each case was represented by the lawyer who faced the greater number of questions.  
199 In Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202 (1960), which was argued 
on May 17, 1960, for example, Chief Justice Earl Warren indicated that he was unclearand 
somewhat skepticalabout counsel’s argument. See Oral Argument at 11, Pennsylvania 
R.R. Co. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202 (1960) (No. 451), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_451#argument, archived at http://perma. 
cc/L78J-8VHR. The transcript also reflects the naturally courteous manner in which Chief 
Justice Earl Warren was known to treat others. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Chief Justice 
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1974). 
200 364 U.S. 361 (1960). The case was argued on October 17–18, 1960. Id. at 361. Oral 
Argument, Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (No. 23), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_23#argument, archived at http://perma. 
cc/4U6Q-UUCA. 
201 See Daniel N. Shaviro, The Story of Knetsch: Judicial Doctrines Combating Tax 
Avoidance, in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
CASES 313 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2002). 
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Mr. Wiprud: He would -- he would -- the money in the pocket, yes, Your 
Honor. 
Justice Harlan: He says he doesn’t. 
Mr. Wiprud: He says -- 
Justice Harlan: He gave some illustrations (Voice Overlap) -- 
Mr. Wiprud: He says-- 
Justice Harlan: -- puzzle me (Voice Overlap) -- 
Mr. Wiprud: Yes, he makes (Voice Overlap) -- 
Justice Harlan: I wish you deal with it. 
Mr. Wiprud: He makes a curious argument that when he entered this 
transaction, he was doomed to an out-of-pocket loss whether or not the 
interest deductions were allowed and therefore he had no tax motive. 
Justice Harlan: Well, can you answer it though?202 
 
Shortly thereafter, Justice Frankfurter attempted to confirm certain elements of what 
he took to be the government’s argument: 
 
Justice Frankfurter: If you are right about that. You said there are two 
answer[s]. One, this is not intended? 
Mr. Wiprud: Right and that’s the specific. 
Justice Frankfurter: And two that he buys the tax benefit? 
Mr. Wiprud: And we think -- 
Justice Frankfurter: If you’re right about one, you don’t need two? 
Mr. Wiprud: Right. Right, Your Honor. I see I have only a few minutes 
left and I have -- 
Justice Frankfurter: If you’re right about -- 
Mr. Wiprud: Excuse me. 
Justice Frankfurter: -- two is really the usual make of Gregory and 
Helvering, isn’t it?203 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Louisiana,204 Justice Black seemingly engaged in 
information gathering in the questions he put to Solicitor General Rankin:  
 
Justice Black: Do they deny that ground? 
I didn’t know there was any difference between here on that point. 
Mr. Rankin: Oh, I think the briefs are pretty strong about that and -- 
Justice Black: I thought they were saying that it didn’t give them anything 
because it’s hard that they had those boundaries to the extent they talked 
                                                            
202 Oral Argument, supra note 200, at 6–7. 
203 Id. at 7–8. 
204 363 U.S. 1 (1960). The case was argued on October 12–15, 1959. Id. at 1. See Oral 
Argument, United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (No. 10 ORIG), available at 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1959/10%20ORIG, archived at http://perma.cc/E5T4-8HK6. 
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about denying the three leagues and therefore nothing was given by the 
Act. 
Mr. Rankin: Well, if -- 
Justice Black: What they were -- the right they had in it and the power 
over it and the ownership of it were simply recognized. I thought that was 
their argument. 
Mr. Rankin: Mr. Justice Black, if that is their position now, the -- the 
United States is pleased to have it, because it simplifies the problem, 
because then it resolves itself to a question of whether they legally did or 
legally did not, at that particular time, -- 
Justice Black: Well, I get it. 
Mr. Rankin: -- have such boundaries. 
Justice Black: If that’s the difference, I think maybe I understand it. 
Maybe they concede, I am not sure, from the opinions it had that legally 
the State did not own it at that time, but that what they wanted to do, 
Congress -- what they insisted the Congress should do was to grant to the 
State that which they had always owned or claimed to own the authority. 
Mr. Rankin: Well, that’s the distinction I am trying to make, Mr. Justice 
Black, between -- the Congress, time after time, they said, “We are not 
asking that this bill shall give us what we claim . . . .”205 
 
As these examples suggest, counsel and the Court frequently interrupted each other, 
so that there were many partial speaking turns in the older cases. In many cases, 
these interruptions are strongly suggestive of conversation. The transcripts show that 
counsel and a Justice were interrupting each other in ways that suggest a common 
understanding and enterprise—where one is anticipating what the other is about to 
say. Oftentimes, it seemed as if one of the Justices were starting a sentence, counsel 
was adding the next few words, the Justice the next few, and so forth.206  
 
B.  Oral Argument in the 2010–12 Period 
 
1.  Early, Frequent, and Direct Interventions 
 
The Justices’ behavior at oral argument in the newer cases was markedly 
different. First, the Justices tended to interrupt counsel on both sides earlier in the 
argument and more directly. There were few cases in which counsel was able to say 
                                                            
205 Id. at 1–2. 
206 An extreme example of partial speaking turns within our sample is the March 21, 
1961 argument in Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556 (1961). During the oral argument 
presented by government counsel, Theodore Gilinsky, the Justices had fifty-nine partial 
speaking turns, ninety full speaking turns, and 149 total speaking turns. One more partial 
speaking turn would have made sixty out of 150, or two-fifths of the Justices’ speaking turns 
that would have been less than a full sentence. No newer case had a comparable percentage 
of partial speaking turns.  
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more than a sentence or two before being interrupted. Typical of these cases is 
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood,207 which involved the validity of mandatory 
arbitration provisions in credit card agreements. Scott Nelson of Public Citizen, who 
represented the respondent credit card holders, spoke only thirty-seven words before 
Justice Sotomayor interrupted him. She did not ask about the facts, existing 
precedent, or the petitioner’s argument, but about a hypothetical: 
 
[Mr. Nelson:] The Credit Repair Organizations Act provides consumers 
with what it explicitly denominates a right to sue, and then it says that any 
right of the consumer under the statute is non-waivable. 
As this Court has said -- 
Justice Sotomayor: Does that mean that there is a violation of the statute 
the minute one of these organizations asks someone to sign an arbitration 
clause? 
Mr. Nelson: There’s -- 
Justice Sotomayor: A $1,000 penalty for the mere asking?208 
 
Similarly, in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.,209 petitioner’s counsel 
spoke forty-five words before being interrupted: 
 
Mr. Fried: Our brief lists six categories of authorities demonstrating that 
the work of an interpreter under 28 U.S.C. section 1920(6) is limited to 
spoken communication. Primary among these is the Court Interpreters Act 
itself, whose central provisions afford simultaneous or consecutive 
spoken interpreter services. When the -- 
Justice Sotomayor: Could I make sure that I understand the extent of your 
argument? Are you saying that it’s interpretation, oral interpretation, just 
in the courtroom?210 
 
And in Fox v. Vice,211 petitioner’s counsel spoke for eighty-five words before being 
interrupted: 
 
Mr. Rosenkranz: Mr. Fox has rock-solid legal claims against a police chief 
based upon facts that were strong enough to send that police chief to 
prison. Yet he’s been ordered to pay all of the attorney’s fees for an entire 
2-year course of a litigation because his lawyers decided to plead and then 
                                                            
207 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). The case was argued on October 11, 2011. Id. at 665. 
208 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1718, Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. 
Ct. 665 (2012) (No. 10-948). Interestingly, the hypothetical was not a follow-up on 
something that had been addressed to petitioner’s counsel. 
209 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012). The case was argued on February 21, 2012. Id. at 1997. 
210 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 
1997 (2012) (No. 10-1472). 
211 131 S. Ct. 2205 (2011). The case was argued on March 22, 2011. Id. at 2205. 
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drop a single Federal theory. That award is wrong and it’s not what 
Congress intended. Congress wanted to protect defendants from the lying 
or the vexatious plaintiff who shouldn’t be in court at all. 
Justice Kennedy: Did we take the case on the assumption -- your -- your 
predecessor and you may disagree -- but did we take the case on the 
assumption that this was a frivolous cause of action?212 
 
Many other examples confirm that the lengthy opening and non-opening 
monologues that regularly characterized the earlier cases are now few and far 
between. 
 
2.  General Judicial Talkativeness 
 
As we have previously noted, the quantitative data is dramatic. In the newer 
cases, the average R is 0.627. In other words, the Justices spoke over sixty-two 
words for every one hundred words spoken by counsel. In the earlier cases, by 
contrast, the Justices spoke only an average of 27.5 words for every one hundred 
words spoken by counsel. While those numbers tell a great deal, a closer look at 
some of the more extreme cases is also instructive. 
The most dramatic outlier among the newer cases was Williams v. Illinois,213 
which involved a confrontation clause challenge to expert DNA testimony proffered 
at trial by someone who had not performed the underlying tests. The R value for the 
argument presented by defense counsel Brian W. Carroll of the Illinois State 
Appellate Defender’s Office was 2.156.214 In other words, the Justices spoke more 
than 215 words for every one hundred words that Carroll spoke. Carroll’s opening 
statement was 144 words long; none of his other speaking turns exceeded 120 
words.215 The state’s R, by contrast, was 0.886, and the federal government’s (as 
amicus curiae) was 0.607. Carroll’s client lost in a 5–4 vote.216  
The highest composite R for all lawyers in a case—1.511—was seen in J. 
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro,217 a case in which an English manufacturer of 
                                                            
212 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205 (2011) (No. 10-114). 
213 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2221 (2012). The case was argued on December 6, 2011. 
214 Transcript of Oral Argument at 323, Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) 
(No. 10-8505). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. Justice Breyer was in the majority, while Justice Scalia, not surprisingly, adhered 
to his views concerning the confrontation clause and was in the minority. See, e.g., Joëlle 
Anne Moreno, Finding Nino: Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause Legacy from Its 
(Glorious) Beginning to (Bitter) End, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1211, 1212–13 (2011). The high R 
for the criminal defendant’s lawyer is not surprising, given the contentiousness and 
importance of the issue, but the R for the lawyer for the state (0.607), which is less than the 
average R for the recent cases (0.627), is somewhat surprising. See 
http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/download/1564/1229. 
217 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). The case was argued on January 11, 2011. 
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industrial machinery challenged the state courts’ jurisdiction to hear claims brought 
by an American worker injured in an industrial accident.218 The case resulted in a 6–
3 decision for the manufacturer. The Justices were active—and seemingly 
partisan—from the outset. Justice Scalia, for example, interrupted the 
manufacturer’s lawyer only forty-seven words into his argument. He did so to offer 
advice about effective advocacy, namely, that counsel should refer to his client’s 
U.S. distributor as “the company that distributed its product,” rather than “its 
distributor”: 
 
Mr. Fergenson: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 
Because J. McIntyre did not direct any activity at residents of New Jersey 
either itself or by directing its distributor MMA to do so and had no 
awareness or knowledge that the distributor took the action that it did 
toward New Jersey, New Jersey lacked adjudicative jurisdiction. 
Justice Scalia: When you say “its distributor,” was this distributor at all 
controlled by the defendant? 
Mr. Fergenson: No, Your Honor. It was not. And both under Ohio law, 
Wells v. Komatsu America, and under the Restatement (Second) Agency, 
section 1-1, the right to control is essential to ascribe actions to create an 
agency, and it’s on a per-purpose basis. 
Justice Scalia: It might be better to refer to it as the company that 
distributed its product, rather than calling it “its distributor.”219 
 
The Justices continued thereafter to interrupt both sides with great frequency; the 
longest non-opening speaking turn was 117 words.220 
Occasionally, the Justices allowed counsel in the newer cases to deliver 
relatively long monologues. For example, in Sorrell v. IMS Health,221 the 
pharmaceutical industry’s First Amendment challenge to a Vermont law protecting 
the confidentiality of individual physicians’ prescribing practices, the Justices 
allowed respondent’s counsel, Thomas C. Goldstein, a frequent Supreme Court 
advocate, to deliver a non-opening monologue of 697 words—the longest in any of 
the newer cases.222 Goldstein later spoke for 604 consecutive words without 
interruption.223 Sorrell is an extreme outlier, however, because the newer cases 
averaged only one 500-word non-opening monologue for every five cases.  
                                                            
218 Id. at 2783–84. 
219 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 
2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343). 
220 Id. at 61. 
221 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2653 (2011). The case was argued on April 26, 2011. 
222 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3538, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 
(2011) (No. 10-779). For a significant portion of this monologue, Goldstein read state 
regulations from his brief’s appendix. Id. 
223 Id. at 4648. 
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In United States v. Tinklenberg,224 which involved the computation of 
excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act,225 defense counsel Jeffrey L. Fisher, 
another experienced Supreme Court advocate, opened his argument as respondent 
with a monologue of 135 words, addressing a question that the Court had raised 
during the petitioner’s argument: 
 
Before turning to the substance, I would like to, if I may, start with 
the procedural question that Justice Sotomayor raised and that -- and that 
my opponent just completed with, because I want to be sure there’s no 
confusion on the posture of this case.  
In particular, this Court’s precedents squarely reject the notion that 
there’s any history in this Court’s precedents for refusing to reach an 
argument in this posture. In particular, in Langness v. Green, 282 U.S. 
531, this Court held in 1931 that a Respondent’s, quote, “right” to defend 
a judgment below on a ground that is properly preserved all along and that 
the lower court reached and rejected is, quote, “beyond successful 
challenge.”  
Now, I’m not sure -- I’m not aware of any exception from that rule 
in the 80 years since.226 
 
Justice Alito intervened:  
 
Suppose the petition here had simply raised one question, and that is the 
question of how you count time under -- under a version of Rule 45 of the 
Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure that is not -- no longer in effect and 
as to which there is no conflict in the circuits. How would you grade the 
chances of the Court taking cert on that?227 
 
Fisher responded: “Well, I’ll take your hypothetical, Justice Alito, but I do want to 
be able to correct the notion that it’s of no longer continuing importance.”228 Fisher 
then proceeded to address the procedural issue in a monologue that lasted for another 
454 words.229 Another question from Justice Alito prompted a 359-word response.230 
Sorrell and Tinklenberg were outliers, as the newer cases were characterized 
by large Rs, small CWs, and short Os. Most frequently, the Justices began their 
questioning after only the briefest of introductions by counsel. In some cases, the 
                                                            
224 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2007 (2011). The case was argued on February 22, 2011.  
225 Id. at 2010–11. 
226 Transcript of Oral Argument at 2526, United States v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007 
(2011) (No. 09-1498). 
227 Id. at 26. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 2628. 
230 Id. at 2830. 
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questioning began as soon as counsel reached the podium. In American Trucking 
Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,231 for example, Justice Sotomayor began 
questioning John F. Bash, an Assistant to the Solicitor General, in his argument as 
amicus curiae, before he could say anything beyond the ceremonial opening words: 
 
Mr. Bash: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court --   
Justice Sotomayor: Do you think the city could pass a regulation like as 
Justice Breyer suggested, that says, stay off residential streets?232 
 
But that too was unusual. More often, as in United States v. Bormes,233 counsel 
would be permitted a sentence or two before the questioning began.234 
While the Justices spoke many more words in the later cases, and occasionally 
more words than counsel, they did not usually do so. The overall R for the newer 
cases—0.627—shows that the Justices spoke sixty-three words for every hundred 
words spoken by counsel. Nonetheless, the differences between the earlier and later 
cases are striking. 
 
3.  Strategic Interventions 
 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the newer cases was the degree to which the 
Justices seemed to make strategic use of their ability to control the courtroom by 
interrupting as they saw fit. The Justices were often quite obvious in their use of 
counsel to make a point they wanted to have made, and they sometimes spoke 
harshly to counsel to undercut a position with which they disagreed. They also 
actively assisted some counsel, suggesting better arguments or helping counsel fill 
in gaps.  
A good example is the lesson in advocacy that Justice Scalia gave counsel for 
the U.K. machinery manufacturer in J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro.235 As 
previously noted, Justice Scalia interrupted counsel to suggest that he refer to the 
U.S. distributor of his client’s machinery as “the company that distributed its 
product” rather than “its distributor.”236 On the other hand, in Dorsey v. United 
                                                            
231 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2096 (2013). The case was argued on April 16, 2013. 
232 Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013) (No. 11-798). 
233 133 S. Ct. 12, 12 (2012). The case was argued on October 2, 2012. 
234 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12 (2012) 
(No. 11-192). Later, during the respondent’s argument presented by Chicago lawyer John G. 
Jacobs, counsel and the Justices sometimes appeared to be exchanging remarks of about 
equal length. For example, Jacobs made a twenty-one word response to a twenty-one word 
statement by Chief Justice Roberts. Id. at 3738. Next, Justice Ginsburg spoke for 109 words 
and Jacobs responded in a 103-word answer. Id. at 3839. 
235 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2780 (2011). The case was argued on January 11, 2011. See supra 
notes 216–219 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra notes 216–219 and accompanying text.  
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States,237 which involved a defendant’s eligibility for a reduced mandatory minimum 
sentence for crack cocaine,238 Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor both expressed 
incredulity at the government’s position: 
 
Justice Sotomayor: Well, generally the word “express” incorporates 
“clear.” 
Mr. Dreeben: --There is no dispute here, I don’t think, that there is a -- a 
lack of an express statement in the Act. But -- 
Justice Sotomayor: So that -- why doesn’t that defeat your case? 
Mr. Dreeben: -- Well, as Justice Scalia explained in his concurring opinion 
in Lockhart v. United States, one Congress cannot impose standards of 
how another Congress is to enact legislation. The subsequent Congress is 
free to choose how it will express its will in the language or structure that 
it sees fit. And I’d like to give an example-- 
Justice Kennedy: Well, so then we -- we ignore The Dictionary Act? 
Mr. Dreeben: No, of course not, Justice Kennedy. But these-- 
Justice Kennedy: And can we ignore 109? 
Mr. Dreeben: No. It provides a background presumption that overcomes 
the common-law rule of abatement, under which, if Congress had 
amended a statute, all prosecutions under the prior statute would be 
deemed to be a nullity and they would -- 
Justice Kennedy: Well, why doesn’t it -- why doesn’t that bring us right 
back to what 109 says?239 
 
Shortly thereafter, Justice Scalia intervened with an unusually supportive comment: 
 
[Mr. Dreeben:] They intended that it be prepared so that sentencing courts 
would use those new mandatory -- 
Justice Scalia: Exactly, and I think we would come out that way. I think 
you are entirely right.240 
 
Like Justice Scalia in Dorsey, other Justices sometimes intervened to help out 
the party for whom they would eventually vote. In Stern v. Marshall,241 which 
                                                            
237 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2321 (2012). The case was argued on April 17, 2012. Id. at 2321. 
238 Id. at 2325–26. The Court held, by a 5–4 vote (with Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor 
in the majority and Justice Scalia in the dissent), that the reduced mandatory minimum 
provision should apply to persons who were sentenced after the effective date of the statute 
for offenses committed before that date. Id. 
239 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1617, Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 
(2012) (No. 11-5683). 
240 Id. at 18. 
241 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2594 (2011). The case was argued on January 18, 2011 (Petitioner 
Howard K. Stern was Executor of the Estate of Vicki Lynn Marshall (Anna Nicole Smith)). 
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involved a bankruptcy judge’s power to enter a final judgment on a debtor’s 
counterclaim,242 Justice Sotomayor helped petitioner’s counsel develop his point:  
 
[Mr. Richland:] Congress drafted the bankruptcy statutes -- 
Justice Sotomayor: Can you tell me why? 
Mr. Richland: Excuse me, Your Honor? I’m sorry. 
Justice Sotomayor: What’s the authority at all for a bankruptcy court to 
adjudicate proof of claims, without violating Article III? I don’t think we 
have ever had a case that’s actually said that. 
Mr. Richland: This Court has never approached that issue directly. Of 
course -- 
Justice Sotomayor: So what’s -- 
Mr. Richland: Excuse me, Your Honor. 
Justice Sotomayor: So, what’s the constitutional basis? 
Mr. Richland: Well, of course, it need not reach that in this case, because 
the court below and the Respondents assume for the purposes of this case 
that, in fact, there was authority for the bankruptcy court. 
Justice Sotomayor: I’m not sure how that helps. If there’s no jurisdiction 
for the bankruptcy court to adjudicate proof of claims, then how can it 
adjudicate counterclaims? Don’t both [claims and counterclaims] fall if 
there’s an Article III violation? 
Mr. Richland: Well, I don’t think so, Your Honor, because Article III, of 
course, is not jurisdictional in the sense that we think of basic fundamental 
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction. It can be waived, of course. But 
beyond that, I think that Marathon, as I said, assumes that there is Article 
III authority to adjudicate the proof of claim . . . . 
Justice Sotomayor: Answer the question. Don’t assume.243 
 
In the Affordable Care Act (ACA) cases,244 which were argued on March 26–28, 
2012, the Justices pulled no punches as they aggressively supported and undercut 
the advocates by turn. On the second day of the argument, when the constitutionality 
of the individual mandate was being argued,245 the Justices interrupted Solicitor 
                                                            
242 Id. at 2600–01. In a 5–4 decision, the Court agreed with respondent and held that 
the bankruptcy court lacked that power. Id. at 2601. Justice Sotomayor was in the dissent. 
Id. at 2621. 
243 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (No. 
10-179). 
244 The cases challenging the Affordable Care Act (ACA) were consolidated as National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). As noted, the cases 
were argued over a three-day period; we considered only the arguments of Tuesday, March 
27, 2012. Id. at 2566. 
245 The individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that individuals 
who are not exempt or otherwise covered (either by an employer or through a government 
plan) must purchase a minimum amount of health insurance coverage or pay a penalty to the 
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General Donald Verrilli 180 times—or once every twenty-two seconds—in his fifty-
six minutes at the lectern.246 According to Supreme Court correspondent Marcia 
Coyle, General Verrilli “was able to speak roughly ten or fewer seconds more than 
40 percent of the time before being interrupted.”247 By contrast, former Solicitor 
General Paul Clement, lead counsel for the parties challenging the ACA, was 
interrupted only thirty-three times in thirty minutes.248 However, General Verrilli 
received what turned out to be a helping hand from Justice Sotomayor, who asked 
him to address the taxing power argument: 
 
Justice Sotomayor: General, could you turn to the tax clause? 
Mr. Verrilli: Yes. Thank you, so -- 
Justice Sotomayor: I have looked for a case that involves the issue of 
whether something denominated by Congress as a penalty was 
nevertheless treated as a tax, except in those situations where the code 
itself or the statute itself said treat the penalty as a tax. Do you know of 
any case where we’ve done that?249 
 
In the end, of course, it was the taxing power that carried the day.  
Another type of judicial advocacy was evident in Peugh v. United States,250 an 
Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to the application of later-enacted sentencing 
guidelines that were less favorable to the defendant than those in effect when the 
offense was committed. At one point, three Justices engaged in a colloquy while the 
advocate simply looked on. Justice Ginsburg implicitly criticized counsel’s 
argument by critiquing the trial court’s holding. Justice Kennedy then spoke, urging 
counsel to answer Justice Ginsburg’s point. Justice Scalia then intervened in an 
attempt to smooth out a rough spot in counsel’s argument. Finally, Justice Kennedy 
interrupted Justice Scalia. The colloquy follows: 
 
Justice Ginsburg: But it’s not -- it’s not a question of whether the judge 
thought that the one guideline was better than the other. He specifically 
said he wasn’t interested in that question. The question was which 
guideline does he follow? Which -- what does he start with? And you 
recognize that you do start with the guidelines. 
                                                            
government. Id. at 2577, 2580. The constitutionality of that provision was challenged under 
the Commerce Clause and the taxing power in Sebelius. Id. at 2581. In a 5–4 vote, the Court 
upheld the ACA under the taxing power, while a different majority, also by a 5–4 vote, held 
that the ACA was beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2600–
01. 
246 COYLE, supra note 37, at 343. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
250 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2072 (2013). The case was argued on February 26, 2013. 
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Justice Kennedy: Yes, I agree with Justice Ginsburg’s follow-up question. 
It seems to me you avoided the question. You said, oh, well, the judge 
looked at all this and selected the sentence he did. But he did so because 
he referred to the later guidelines, and I think you have to recognize that . 
. .  
Justice Scalia: I think you are saying it doesn’t matter because they are 
advisory -- 
Justice Kennedy: Well, I’d like to finish. Unless I am wrong under the 
record.251 
 
Justice Scalia intervened to reframe counsel’s argument, perhaps in an attempt to 
influence Justice Kennedy (who may have seemed to be leaning toward Justice 
Ginsburg’s position), but Justice Kennedy would not yield.  
In other cases, the Justices were even more obvious in using counsel to advance 
their own arguments. For example, in Thompson v. North American Stainless,252 a 
Title VII third-party retaliation case, Justice Alito posed a question about the 
plaintiff’s standing to government counsel, who appeared as amicus curiae,253 but 
Justice Ginsburg answered the question before counsel could do so.254 Counsel then 
continued briefly with her argument before Justice Alito resumed his questioning.255  
The newer arguments are also noteworthy for their use of sarcasm. For 
example, in Maryland v. King,256 which involved the constitutionality of DNA 
testing in the “booking” process, Justice Scalia immediately interrupted the state’s 
argument with a sarcastic remark: 
 
Ms. Winfree: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 
Since 2009, when Maryland began to collect DNA samples from 
arrestees charged with violent crimes and burglary, there have been 225 
matches, 75 prosecutions, and 42 convictions, including that of 
Respondent King. 
Justice Scalia: Well, that’s really good. 
I’ll bet you if you conducted a lot of unreasonable searches and seizures, 
you’d get more convictions, too. 
(Laughter) 
Justice Scalia: That proves absolutely nothing.257 
                                                            
251 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 
(2013) (No. 12-62). 
252 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). The case was argued on December 7, 2010. 
253 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Thompson v. North American Stainless, 131 S. 
Ct. 863 (2011) (No. 09-291). 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1958 (2013). The case was argued on February 26, 2013. 
257 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 
12-207). One important aspect of the art of advocacy, of course, is to begin one’s argument 
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Similarly, in Miller v. Alabama,258 the juvenile mandatory life-without-parole case, 
several of the Justices responded sarcastically to petitioner’s arguments: 
 
Justice Sotomayor: So, how do we get rid of the mandatory if that’s what 
we’re going to do?  
Mr. Stevenson: It’s a challenge, and I -- and I concede that. But I -- and 
so, the first part of my answer would be that I think the easier rule to write 
would be that there is a categorical ban on all life without parole sentences 
for all children up until the age of 18, acknowledging -- 
Justice Scalia: How -- how do I come to that decision? What do I -- just 
consult my own preferences on this matter?259 
 
Justice Alito later intervened with a sarcastic remark: 
 
Justice Kennedy: So, it’s very difficult to assess your answer to Justice 
Alito that, oh, the legislatures don’t know about this.  
Mr. Stevenson: Well, in -- that answer -- that number, Your Honor, is 
partly rooted in the fact that these sentences are mandatory. There is no 
one capable, once the court makes a decision to try the child as an adult, 
to do anything to consider the status of children.  
Justice Kagan: Mr. Stevenson -- 
Justice Alito: If you think these legislators don’t understand what their 
laws provide, why don’t you contact them? And when they -- when you 
tell them, do you realize that in your State a -- a 16-year-old or a 17-year-
old may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for murder, 
they’ll say: Oh, my gosh, I never realized that; let’s change the law.260  
 
Finally, Justice Scalia challenged counsel with an observation about “that 
rehabilitation thing”: 
 
Mr. Stevenson: Well, I think one of the problems, Your Honor, with -- 
with trying to make these judgments is that -- that even psychologists say 
that we can’t make good long-term judgments about the rehabilitation and 
                                                            
in a way that does not unnecessarily invite an immediate, counterproductive or even hostile 
response from the bench. See Barry Sullivan, The Art of Advocacy, 42 LOY. U. CHIC. L.J. 
xxiii, xxx–xxxii (2010) (discussing Solicitor General Olson’s opening in Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 446 (2004)). Ms. Winfree might well have anticipated a response along the lines of 
Justice Scalia’s interruption in the preceding excerpt.  
258 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs were consolidated 
and argued together on March 20, 2012. Id. at 2455. 
259 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 
10-9646). 
260 Id. at 1415. 
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transitory character of these young people. That’s the reason why in 
Graham this Court didn’t permit that kind of discretion. We know that --  
Justice Scalia: Well, I thought that modern penology has abandoned that 
rehabilitation thing, and they -- they no longer call prisons reformatories 
or whatever, and punishment is the -- is the criterion now. Deserved 
punishment for crime.  
Mr. Stevenson: Well --  
Justice Scalia: Now, if that’s the criterion, is everything that you say 
irrelevant?261 
 
Not only were the Justices interrupting more frequently and talking more overall in 
the newer cases, but they may well have been interrupting more strategically and 
were more prone to speak sarcastically in their interventions.262  
 
4.  Colloquies, Cross Talk, and Consecutive Justice Speaking Turns 
 
In the newer cases, colloquies between the Justices and counsel generally were 
much shorter, and extended colloquies were less frequent, than in the older cases. 
The substance of colloquies also appeared to be different. In the older cases, the 
Justices tended to use colloquies to establish a fact or to clarify a particular legal 
argument. In the newer cases, colloquies were more likely to involve hypotheticals, 
perhaps evidencing a greater concern with limiting principles or simply reflecting 
the dominance of former law professors on the Court. For example, in Camreta v. 
Greene,263 which involved the constitutionality of an in-school student interrogation 
concerning suspected parental sexual abuse, Justice Breyer probed the limits of a 
suggested Fourth Amendment rule through a series of hypotheticals:  
 
Justice Breyer: Was there a seizure? No -- no professor -- no policeman? 
Ms. Kubitschek: If – if -- 
                                                            
261 Id. at 21–22.  
262 Again, our study is limited to Tuesday cases. If our study included arguments on 
other days, many additional examples would be available. The oral argument transcripts in 
Doe v. Reed, 558 U.S. 1142 (2010), and National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), provide many examples of sarcasm during oral argument, 
while the transcripts in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (166 interruptions), 
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (87 interruptions), and Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
560 U.S. 370 (2010) (156 interruptions), provide instructive examples of interruptions. (As 
noted, Sebelius involved three days of argument. While we looked only at the Tuesday 
session, the transcripts for all three days contain numerous examples of sarcasm.) See also 
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Justices Are Talking More, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2011, 7:51 
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030104 
697.html?sid=ST2011030106550, archived at http://perma.cc/D3DM-528J (discussing the 
recent trend of increased interruption by Justices during oral arguments). 
263 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). The case was argued on March 1, 2011.  
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Justice Breyer: School nurse? 
Ms. Kubitschek: The school nurse? 
Justice Breyer: Seizure? 
Ms. Kubitschek: Probably not a seizure. 
Justice Breyer: And so, it’s not a seizure if exactly the same thing happens 
but there is no outside person there, but it is a seizure if there’s an outside 
person? 
Ms. Kubitschek: If the outside person comes into the school -- 
Justice Breyer: That’s the rule as to whether there’s a seizure? 
Ms. Kubitschek: That’s one of the factors to look at. 
Justice Breyer: No, no, no, whether there’s a seizure? 
Ms. Kubitschek: Yes.264 
 
Similarly, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,265 which involved the propriety 
under Rule 23(a) of a nationwide class in a Title VII sex discrimination case, Justice 
Scalia engaged in a brief colloquy with class counsel. Justice Scalia explained that 
he was talking about hypothetical cases: 
 
Justice Scalia: Well, otherwise, how could you say that all -- all of the 
companies are -- are -- are presumptively engaging in sex discrimination? 
Mr. Sellers: Well, Justice Scalia, I -- I -- I want to deal with the -- in this 
instance, we have -- it’s not just any old analysis that we’re -- that we’re 
using. We have statistical regression analysis that isolates and takes into 
account the factors such as performance and -- and seniority. 
Justice Scalia: See, I wasn’t talking about this case.266 
 
The Justices in the newer cases more frequently talked over each other—or talked 
immediately after each other—with little or no participation by counsel. For 
example, in Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson,267 which involved the federal Medicaid 
statute’s possible preemption of an irrebuttable state law presumption, Justice 
Ginsburg followed Justice Scalia, who followed Justice Breyer.268 Then, after North 
Carolina Solicitor General John F. Maddrey spoke briefly, Justice Sotomayor and 
Justice Ginsburg both spoke. The colloquy follows: 
 
Justice Breyer: We know what you would like, but we don’t know the 
answer. 
                                                            
264 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (No. 
09-1454).  
265 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The case was argued on March 29, 2011. 
266 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4243, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011) (No. 10-277). 
267 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013). The case was argued on January 8, 2013. Id. at 1391. 
268 Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391 
(2013) (No. 12-98). 
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Justice Scalia: Don’t you think the statute may -- may give you the 
answer? . . . It applies to judgments as well as to settlements.269 
Justice Ginsburg: You answered the question with respect to jury verdicts. 
I suppose it would be no different if it’s the judge that found the 10 percent 
rather than the jury. 
Mr. Maddrey: I would agree. 
Justice Ginsburg. The statute -- 
Justice Sotomayor: I didn’t hear Justice Ginsburg’s question. 
Justice Ginsburg: The question that Justice Breyer was asking about the 
10 percent has already been answered because we were told that if a jury 
allocated 10 percent to medicals, it would not make any difference, the 
statute entitles the State to 30 percent. 
Justice Sotomayor: Basically you are saying the judge would be required 
to give you your one-third regardless of what the jury said. 
Mr. Maddrey: Exactly.270 
 
Later, during the argument presented by E.M.A. counsel Christopher G. 
Browning Jr., Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Roberts each spoke twice before 
allowing counsel to respond.271 Later still, the Justices spoke consecutively three 
separate times, without any interjection by counsel.272 Such incidents of Justice cross 
talk and back-to-back speaking turns show a Court firmly in control of the 
courtroom. 
It is commonly thought that the Justices and counsel in the older cases engaged 
in more one-on-one conversations, while the Justices in the newer cases overwhelm 
counsel from all angles, but our study did not substantiate that view. For example, 
in Miller v. Alabama,273 the juvenile mandatory life-without-parole case, Justice 
Scalia made twelve consecutive interventions without being interrupted by another 
Justice: 
 
Justice Scalia: What about 50 years? Is that -- is that too much? 
Mr. Stevenson: What the Court held in -- in Graham --  
                                                            
269 The statute provides that, “Any attorney retained by the beneficiary of the assistance 
shall, out of the proceeds obtained on behalf of the beneficiary by settlement with, judgment 
against, or otherwise from a third party by reason of injury or death, distribute to the 
Department the amount of assistance paid by the Department [up to 33%].” N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 108A-57 (2011). 
270 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1617, Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 
1391 (2013) (No. 12-98). 
271 Id. at 3132. 
272 Id. at 35. Similarly, in Camreta v. Greene, Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor 
began talking over each other at one point. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Camreta v. 
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (No. 09-1454). Later, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Sotomayor did the same. Id. at 14. 
273 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The case was argued on March 20, 2012. Id. at 2455. 
1070 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
Justice Scalia: Well, you know, once -- once you depart from the principle 
that we’ve enunciated that death is different, why is life without parole 
categorically different from 60 years or 70 years or -- you know, you’d be 
back here next term with a 60-year sentence? 
Mr. Stevenson: Justice Scalia, I think you’re absolutely right, that there is 
a point at which a term-of-year sentence could constitute the same kind of 
judgment --  
Justice Scalia: Okay. 
Mr. Stevenson: -- as life imprisonment without parole. 
Justice Scalia: Good. 
Mr. Stevenson: But there is a distinction obviously between life 
imprisonment without parole and any other term sentence . . . . 
Justice Scalia: I’ll change my -- I’ll change my question to 50 years 
without possibility of parole. 
Mr. Stevenson: I - in -- 
Justice Scalia: Then you have no -- no distinction, right? 
Mr. Stevenson: Well, I think there, it would be a tough case. 
I think imposed on a juvenile, a 50-year sentence -- 
Justice Scalia: Without -- 
Mr. Stevenson: -- would not create the meaningful possibility of release 
that this Court ordered in the Graham context. . . .   
Justice Scalia: How about 15 years old? 15, 60 years; or 14, 70 years? 
Mr. Stevenson: I think all of the -- 
Justice Scalia: What -- what’s the distinction between 14 and 15? 
Mr. Stevenson: Well, I think from a sentencing perspective, all of those 
sentences would be problematic. But the distinction between a 14-year-
old and a 15-year-old for constitutional purposes is that, of course, the 
younger you are, the more compelling are these deficits, these distinctions, 
that -- 
Justice Scalia: I understand, but how are we -- how are we to know where 
to draw those lines? We can’t do it on the basis of any historical tradition, 
certainly.274 
 
Other cases tell a similar story. In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co, Inc. v. Bartlett,275 
which involved the possible preemption of state law design-defect claims, Justice 
Sotomayor engaged counsel for eleven speaking turns without the intervention of 
another Justice,276 and Justice Breyer spoke to counsel eight consecutive times 
without being interrupted by another Justice in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 
                                                            
274 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 
10-9647). 
275 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). The case was argued on March 19, 2013. 
276 Transcript of Oral Argument at 710, Mut. Pharm. Co. Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 
2466 (2013) (No. 12-142). 
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Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,277 which involved a claimed waiver of sovereign 
immunity.278  
Although the Justices in the newer cases sometimes seemed to engage in rapid-
fire questioning from nearly all directions at once, our study shows that lengthy one-
on-one colloquies also occurred frequently. Thus, while the length and tone of 
colloquies may have changed, and there is an undeniable increase in the frequency 
with which the Justices interrupt each other and ask multiple questions of counsel at 
the same time, those changes have not had the effect of displacing one-on-one 
colloquies altogether. In the later cases, the Justices still often engaged with counsel 
one-on-one, but they also spoke more overall and seemed less reluctant to pile 
questions on top of one another. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Our study admittedly involves a relatively small number of cases. We cannot 
claim to know with certainty that the two three-year periods we have chosen are 
truly representative of the longer periods from which they were selected, and we 
cannot claim to know with certainty that the Justices’ performance in Tuesday cases 
is truly representative of the Court’s performance during the rest of the week. But 
we have no reason to doubt the representativeness of our data sets in either respect, 
and some of the differences between the two periods are particularly stark and 
compelling. In any event, we offer our data for what they are: two snapshots taken 
at two particular points in time.279 With these parameters in mind, we nonetheless 
believe that our study shows the existence of significant differences between the two 
periods and that some important conclusions may be drawn from our study. 
The cases in our study suggest that what happens at oral argument, and the 
shape that oral argument takes, are substantially different from what they appear to 
have been a few decades ago. While the idea that the Justices (or some of them) 
value oral argument as an opportunity for influencing their colleagues is not a new 
idea, the Justices’ extra-curial pronouncements on the nature and purpose of oral 
argument now seem to emphasize that aspect of oral argument much more than in 
the past. It is not clear whether that new emphasis correlates with changes in the 
Justices’ in-court behavior, but the Justices in the newer cases certainly were more 
talkative and seemed to act more aggressively toward counsel and each other. That 
is not surprising. With twice the number of law clerks, vastly improved legal-
research and word-processing resources, and markedly fewer cases to decide, the 
current Justices can be far better prepared for each argument than their predecessors 
were. Being better prepared, they are more likely to have strong views about the 
                                                            
277 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012). The case was argued on April 24, 2012. 
278 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1417, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012) (No. 11-246). 
279 In addition, we have made no effort to determine the existence (or not) of any 
possible trend between the two data points. 
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proper outcome of a case at an earlier stage in the process, and to be more personally 
invested in the case by the time of the oral argument.280 On the other hand, the time 
set aside for oral argument in each case is only half what it was before. So the 
Justices may know more about the case and have a stronger incentive to say what 
they know, but they have less time in which to do it. Thus, the Justices seem to 
compete with each other—and with counsel—for the time available.281 
An explanation frequently given for the emergence of the “new oral argument” 
is that the Justices increasingly see oral argument mainly as an opportunity to 
persuade each other—an opportunity that their otherwise formalistic interactions do 
not provide. Once certiorari has been granted, the Justices typically do not discuss a 
case among themselves until the post-argument conference, which has been 
truncated in more recent times.282 At oral argument, therefore, those who have made 
                                                            
280 EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 313. It may be, of course, that seeming 
to be more personally invested in the outcome of a case at an earlier stage (that is, when the 
case is being argued orally) is a function of their being better prepared for oral argument. It 
may also be the case that law professors (who now constitute a plurality of the Court’s 
membership) are more likely to have more definite views about what the law ought to be, 
with respect to a wider range of legal issues, than other Justices, and it is almost certainly the 
case that longer-serving Justices will be particularly protective of their prior contributions to 
the Court’s jurisprudence. It is likely, for example, that a Justice will be particularly active 
at oral argument if he or she perceives a danger to the continued viability of a precedent or 
line of precedents for which he or she is the progenitor, and that increased level of activity 
may be mainly directed toward the party that is perceived to represent that danger. The 
perceived threat to a favored precedent or line of authority may well account for certain large 
Rs, such as that produced by the criminal defendant’s argument in Williams v. Illinois. See 
supra note 213. More generally, if factors such as a greater degree of preparedness mean that 
most or all of the Justices come to oral argument with their minds firmly made up, the value 
of oral argument may well be questioned. Although oral argument can have value because it 
allows the public to understand the case and the process of adjudication, it can hardly be 
valuable for that reason if it is only a charade. 
281 It may also be that there is some natural limit to the Justices’ active participation at 
oral argument. According to that hypothesis, the Justices’ participation might remain 
relatively constant (or at least not double) if the time for argument were doubled, 
notwithstanding a caseload of stable size and a consistently high amount of argument 
preparation. It might be that the Justices are now speaking close to the maximum amount 
that they would be likely to speak in any event, and that much of the additional time achieved 
through a return to the previous standard of one hour to the side might well be available to 
counsel. Some proof for that hypothesis may be found in the lack of proportionality between 
the Justice words to lawyer words ratios for the two periods. In addition to other possible 
explanations, it may be that the more favorable lawyer words to Justice words ratio in the 
earlier period was due to the fact that the Justices had as much time as they felt necessary to 
question counsel or otherwise express their views. 
282 Professor Epstein and her coauthors have argued that the conference is limited in 
duration, artificial in structure, stilted in content, and, in general, overrated as an effective 
means of exchanging ideas, sharpening arguments, or forging consensus. Judges have their 
own moral and political values; there is a strong norm of equality among judges, and judges 
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up their minds can signal their intentions to their colleagues and do battle for the 
votes of those who may still be undecided.283 The Justices’ interventions are likely 
to be statements or questions intended to persuade, rather than questions intended to 
elicit additional information that they do not know. In an important sense, according 
to this theory, oral argument may have become a substitute for the discussion that 
could occur at the post-argument conference, but apparently does not.  
This explanation may well have some traction. As Professor Epstein and her 
coauthors have noted, most judges do not relish challenging their colleagues’ 
positions in the conference room. It is easier, and often more effective, to use the 
questioning of counsel as a vehicle for pointing out the alleged absurdity of an 
argument that one’s colleague might otherwise find persuasive.284 Indeed, if the 
point were attacked effectively at oral argument, the colleague might be sufficiently 
chastened as to refrain from even voicing that view in the conference room. Given 
the apparent shortening of the conference, bringing the conference discussion into 
the courtroom is not illogical; but there is some doubt as to whether oral argument 
even serves the colleague-persuasion function. Professor Epstein and her coauthors 
have suggested that most judges are rarely influenced by their colleagues’ views or 
arguments and seldom change their minds based on what transpires at oral argument 
or in the conference room.285 They may do so more often in highly technical cases, 
but those are not the cases that are most salient at the Supreme Court level.286  
                                                            
are not chosen with a view toward effective group interactions or consensus building. At the 
conference, the judges speak their piece (but also apparently pull their punches) and then 
vote. It is considered a serious breach of etiquette to interrupt a judge when it is his turn to 
speak, which also discourages meaningful interaction. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra 
note 3, at 306–07. Professor Epstein and her coauthors have also compared service on a 
multi-member court to an arranged marriage without possibility of divorce. Id. at 32.  
283 The Justices (or many of them) probably have viewed oral argument in this way for 
a very long time, but the Justices’ attempts at signaling and persuasion seem to have become 
less subtle, less artful, and more obvious in recent times. 
284 EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 308–09. 
285 Id. at 307–09. 
286 Judge Posner has argued that deliberation and discussion are simply overvalued. In 
most cases, according to Judge Posner, a competent judge will quickly make up her mind 
about the correct decision in a case and be relatively impervious to persuasion thereafter, 
except, perhaps, in highly technical, nonsalient cases, in which the correct outcome may be 
less obvious. According to Judge Posner, spending more time in discussion may seem 
desirable to intellectuals because they are accustomed to settling disputes through reasoned 
discussion, but that is not the case in judicial deliberation because judges often have 
fundamentally different views and “reasoned argument . . . is ineffectual when the arguers 
do not share common premises.” POSNER, supra note 47, at 302. “In such situations,” Judge 
Posner believes, “the principal effect of arguing is . . . to drive the antagonists farther apart—
or at least to cause them to dig in their heels.” Id. Judge Posner’s argument also follows from 
his view that a judge’s “difficulty making up his mind . . . is a psychological trait rather than 
an index of conscientiousness.” Id. at 299. It is not clear, of course, why legal questions 
should be especially impermeable to meaningful argument and persuasion, so long as the 
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As a group, the Justices dominated the courtroom in the newer cases, and, 
among the Justices, there was intense competition for the short time available. 
Whether the Justices act as they do because they see oral argument mainly as an 
opportunity to persuade their colleagues is difficult to know. It may also be that they 
believe, based on professional training and experience (reinforced, perhaps, by 
certain personality traits shared by those who become Justices) that the spirit of 
combat reflected in the newer arguments is truly the most effective way of 
ascertaining truth, or—more modestly—the best answers to the questions that are 
theirs to decide. It may be that they enjoy the frisson of the “passage with counsel”287 
and with each other. It may also be that, being so well prepared (and possibly having 
made up their minds before the argument begins), they have strong views and a 
strong incentive to express them. But, having made up their minds (and suspecting 
that others have as well), they may also see oral argument as a pointless exercise 
made bearable only by taking charge. Or perhaps they just want to “have a good 
time,” which often means showing off their own cleverness or erudition. 
Alternatively, they may see oral argument as simply a prescribed part of their job, 
and they may not have deeply theorized its purpose, notwithstanding the many extra-
curial statements that some of them have made about it. Different Justices may 
perceive oral argument differently, and the same Justices may perceive oral 
argument differently, depending on the case and what is at stake.288 
To be sure, the Justices in the older cases also sought to influence their 
colleagues by asking questions, making statements, and emphasizing points they 
found particularly weak or compelling. What seems markedly different, however, is 
that the Justices in the older cases seem to have acted in a way that was more 
congenial to the other purposes of oral argument: providing counsel with a 
meaningful opportunity to craft a narrative that makes their best case directly to the 
Justices; assuring the parties that their concerns have been heard and fairly 
considered; communicating to the public, in an effective way, what is at stake in a 
particular case; and ensuring public confidence in the justice system. To the extent 
we can tell, the earlier Justices also seemed more likely to ask questions about things 
that were actually bothering them, and they generally gave counsel a reasonable 
opportunity to answer their questions. It was not all sweetness and light, of course. 
We know that at least one Justice of that period often irritated his colleagues (and 
counsel) by seeming to monopolize the argument time and treating counsel as if they 
                                                            
interlocutors act in good faith and display an “openness to mutual transformation.” DAVID 
TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 93 (1987). Of course, interlocutors “differ not only in 
[their] judgments and in [their] ways of reaching those judgments, but also in their 
susceptibility to persuasion, to considering and adopting other points of view and other 
strategies.” Thomas Morawetz, The Epistemology of Judging: Wittgenstein and Deliberative 
Practices, 3 CAN. J. OF L. & JURISPRUDENCE 35, 43 (July 1990). 
287 See WEST, supra note 28, at 29.  
288 See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
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were students in his class.289 Perhaps consistent with the mores of that earlier period, 
the Justices generally treated counsel with respect. They seldom, if ever, seemed 
rude or sarcastic. And they simply talked a great deal less. 
The more recent arguments display a different dynamic. The Justices talk a 
great deal. They often interrupt an advocate’s argument after a few words—before 
she has had an opportunity to state what she thinks the case is about. The Justices 
rarely allow counsel to develop even the outlines of a coherent narrative, and they 
frequently use an advocate’s limited time (half the amount allotted to counsel in the 
older cases, as noted previously) to joke or argue with each other. The argument that 
results is not often the argument that the lawyer wanted the Justices to hear, but that 
has always been the case; it is inherent in the nature of oral argument. What the 
Justices now hear, however, is the argument that the most vocal and persistent of the 
Justices want to make. And some of the Justices seem very vocal and very persistent. 
Whether the argument that results is the argument the Justices need to hear is another 
question. Similarly, the narrative—if one or more emerges—is likely to be the 
Justices’ narrative. The Justices also can come across as sarcastic or rude to counsel, 
sometimes berating counsel or making jokes at his or her expense, and belittling the 
interests and concerns of the litigants.290 They sometimes interrupt with the obvious 
intention of helping one side or the other. They sometimes seem to filibuster with 
the apparent intention of preventing a lawyer from making what might have been a 
good point. They sometimes interrupt with little obvious purpose—behavior more 
appropriate, perhaps, for a law school moot court competition. In moot court, after 
all, the purpose is to determine which side has the better gladiator, but that is not the 
purpose of litigation in the real world, where “human opportunities and liberties and 
life itself may be taken,”291 as Judge Noonan has emphasized. Finally, the transcripts 
sometimes seem to suggest that the Justices may see oral argument as an opportunity 
to test their forensic skills against those of counsel. In that game, the Justices not 
only call the balls and strikes, but also pitch, bat, and field. Like all judges, the 
                                                            
289 See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 37–48 (discussing the attitudes that Justice 
Frankfurter’s colleagues had toward him); STEVENS, supra note 59, at 71 (describing Justice 
Frankfurter’s oral argument style). These dynamics were not particularly noticeable, 
however, in the specific cases contained in our sample. 
290 See supra notes 84, 262–266 and accompanying text. 
291 NOONAN, supra note 40, at 14. See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of 
the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in TEXT AND TEACHING: THE SEARCH FOR 
HUMAN EXCELLENCE 2–3 (Michael J. Collins & Francis J. Ambrosio eds., 1991) (“My 
relation to this great text is inescapably public. . . . [C]onsequences flow from a Justice’s 
interpretation in a direct and immediate way. A judicial decision respecting the 
incompatibility of Jim Crow with a constitutional guarantee of equality is not simply a 
contemplative exercise in defining the shape of a just society,” but an order “supported by 
the full coercive power of the State—that the present society change in a fundamental aspect. 
. . . One does not forget how much may depend on the decision. More than litigants may be 
affected. The course of vital social, economic and political currents may be directed.”). 
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Justices have immense power in the courtroom, and the current Justices are not 
reluctant to exercise it. 
It may be that other aspects of the Justices’ behavior can be explained by 
changing social mores. In our time, people tend to be more direct and outspoken and 
may seem less concerned with being polite or treating others with respect. These 
trends may have had some effect on the Court and the way it functions. Some of the 
Justices treat each other292—and sometimes the parties293—pretty roughly in their 
opinions; they can also be rough with the lawyers who appear before them at oral 
argument. The lessons the Justices teach in that respect have not been lost on the 
lawyers, who sometimes file briefs that mete out similar treatment to their 
opponents. But lawyers are still bound to treat the Justices with respect according to 
the old ways, so the intrusion into the courtroom of coarser social values generally 
moves in only one direction.  
The “new oral argument” is undoubtedly stimulating for the participants—and 
particularly so for the Justices, who dominate the courtroom and must be treated 
with respect, regardless of how they treat those who appear before them. But the 
“new oral argument” is not about the lawyers, who can sometimes seem to be 
bystanders or straight men. Nor is it about the parties, whose real-world interests 
                                                            
292 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 
22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 399 (2000) (collecting examples). 
293 Justices rarely dissent from a denial of certiorari. Even more rarely do Justices 
answer such dissents with concurring opinions on the denial of certiorari. See GRESSMAN, ET 
AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 57 at 330–34. But one such a concurrence 
provides an apt illustration: 
 
Justice Blackmun begins his statement by describing with poignancy the death of 
a convicted murderer by lethal injection. He chooses, as the case in which to make 
that statement, one of the less brutal of the murders that regularly come before 
us—the murder of a man ripped by a bullet suddenly and unexpectedly, with no 
opportunity to prepare himself and his affairs, and left to bleed to death on the 
floor of a tavern. The death-by-injection which Justice Blackmun describes looks 
pretty desirable next to that. It looks even better next to some of the other cases 
currently before us which Justice Blackmun did not select as the vehicle for his 
announcement that the death penalty is always unconstitutional—for example, the 
case of the 11-year-old girl raped by four men and then killed by stuffing her 
panties down her throat. See McCollum v. North Carolina, cert. pending No. 93-
7200. How enviable a quiet death by lethal injection compared with that! 
 
Collins v. Callins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1142–43 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the denial of 
certiorari). McCollum, whom Justice Scalia took as his case in point, was later exonerated. 
See Ed Mazza, Scalia Once Pushed Death Penalty for Now-Exonerated Inmate Henry Lee 
McCollum, HUFFINGTON POST, (Sep. 2, 2014, 11:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/09/02/scalia-death-penalty_n_5756362.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4HMW-
QRTW. 
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hang in the balance. Nor is it about the public,294 despite the fact that oral argument 
is the most public part of the process we have devised for resolving some of the most 
important questions of public law.295 In short, the Justices may not have a shared 
vision concerning the purpose of oral argument, but it does seem, as the expression 
goes, to be “all about them.” In that respect, the Justices may be seen to give less 
than optimal attention to the litigants or their concerns, except insofar as they are the 
abstracted authors and materials, respectively, of those “sordid controversies” that 
are “the stuff out of which” the Justices will shape “great and shining truths.”296  
Our study raises some fundamental questions about the conduct of oral 
argument, its value, and its present and potential roles in the decisional process. 
How, for example, does one square the basic idea of legal representation and the 
lawyer’s role in an adversarial system with a reality in which the Justices not only 
speak more than the lawyers, but also seem to do battle for one side or the other? In 
addition, as things now stand, one might well wonder whether the Justices believe 
that oral argument serves any real purpose in the decisional process. If they do, one 
might further wonder what that purpose is, and whether, in any event, the “new oral 
argument” represents the optimal use of the only time that counsel and the Justices 
are able to interact face to face and in public. If it does not, why is that? And what 
should be done about it? If the only purpose that oral argument serves is to provide 
an opportunity for the Justices to talk to each other, does that suggest more deep-
seated problems with the decisional process? The same question is raised, of course, 
if the Justices have come to believe that oral argument serves no purpose at all. But 
that view would be shortsighted. Clearly, oral argument serves important purposes 
that may not be acknowledged or well served by the way in which oral argument is 
now conducted. What goes on at oral argument is critically important in assuring the 
parties that their case has been fully and fairly heard. It is also important to the 
public, both in terms of understanding the circumstances of the particular case and 
in terms of understanding the role of the Court. It is also critically important to the 
respect that government owes its citizens in a democratic regime. Finally, the way 
                                                            
294 In a sense, of course, the way the Justices act at oral argument may be influenced by 
its public nature, as Judge Posner has suggested: “So consider a Supreme Court in which . . 
. two very talkative Justices replace two silent ones. The remaining silent Justices may begin 
to feel uncomfortable, to feel like wallflowers, worrying that the media will raise questions 
about their competence—will suggest that maybe they aren’t quick enough or sufficiently 
well prepared to be able to participate actively in the give and take of oral argument.” 
POSNER, supra note 6, at 57. 
295 The Court is not simply charged with “say[ing] what the law is,” but with making 
sure that the people understand the processes by which the meaning of the Constitution and 
the liberties of the people are clarified and given effect. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See, e.g., Barry Sullivan, The Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and 
the Uses of History, 60 TUL. L. REV. 314, 325 (1985) (noting the educational role of the 
federal judiciary); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative 
Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 1004–12 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
educational role). For that reason, oral argument should be transparent to the governed in 
some essential sense. 
296 CARDOZO, supra note 41, at 35. 
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in which oral argument is conducted in the Supreme Court is an important 
benchmark as to what constitutes sound practice and appropriate behavior for judges 
throughout the land.  
In sum, our study suggests that the nature of oral argument may have changed 
greatly, if imperceptibly and without deliberate design, in the past half century, and 
that the time is now right to consider whether that change has been for the best. 
Assuming that we are correct in the conclusions we draw from the data we have 
studied, we think that the Court as a whole should evaluate the current practice of 
oral argument. More specifically, the Court needs to consider what it hopes to 
achieve from oral argument, both in light of current circumstances and with a proper 
understanding of the Court’s role in our democratic society. What this means is that 
the Justices need to talk candidly among themselves about the evolution of oral 
argument, the purposes that oral argument can and should serve, their own behavior 
at oral argument, the possible effects of their behavior and the impression it makes, 
and what might be done to correct what many may perceive as an excessive 
indulgence on the part of the Justices.   
In addition, given the steep decline in the Court’s caseload, it may be that the 
original justification for shortening the length of oral argument no longer holds. 
Perhaps that decision should be reconsidered. A longer oral argument might allow 
counsel the time to develop their arguments in a more coherent way, while also 
providing the public with a better understanding of both the case and the process, as 
well as allowing the Justices, who clearly are well prepared for oral argument, 
sufficient time to interact with counsel and each other to better effect. Alternatively, 
the Court may wish to consider setting aside some portion of the time allocated for 
oral argument for counsel to be able to speak without interruption by the Justices, 
perhaps at the beginning or at the end of counsel’s argument.297 In any event, to the 
                                                            
297 Chief Justice Roberts apparently attempted early in his tenure to persuade his 
colleagues that their questioning of counsel should cease once the white light (signifying that 
the attorney’s time would expire in five minutes) appeared, but, according to the Chief 
Justice, even he had a difficult time conforming his conduct to that convention. See Remarks 
of Chief Justice John Roberts, Supreme Court Term Review, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judicial Conference, June 29, 2013, available at http://www.c-
span.org/video/?c4457880/hot-bench, archived at http://perma.cc/7YK3-WFZM. A more 
effective mechanism might be provided through the introduction of a convention whereby 
the Court would set aside a certain amount of time for counsel to speak without interruption 
at the beginning of her argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has long followed that practice in connection with en banc hearings. See PRACTITIONERS’ 
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, October 2014, 
at 73, available at www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/docs/pracguide.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZPC8-YHWX (“Generally, each side is allowed thirty minutes for argument. 
The court will not ask questions during the first half of the allotted time for opening 
argument, unless counsel waives this privilege.”). In addition, that innovation would permit 
counsel to frame her argument and establish a narrative, which is a purpose that could not be 
achieved simply by permitting counsel some amount of uninterrupted time at the end of her 
argument. 
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extent that oral argument may have come to substitute for the conference as an 
opportunity for the Justices to discuss the cases they have to decide, perhaps the 
Court should reconsider the ways in which the Justices communicate with each 
other.  
Most important, the Court needs to consider whether the present practice of oral 
argument truly serves the interests of the parties and the public, as well as the Court’s 
own interests, and it needs to act based on its answer to that question. Otherwise, we 
risk the possibility of continued reliance on one aspect of the decisional process that 
seems to have evolved without conscious direction and may not now optimally serve 
the purposes for which it was created. We do not suggest, of course, that we can or 
should return to comparatively sleepy days of the Warren Court, but the differences 
between the practice of oral argument then and now are sufficiently stark to raise 
questions as to whether the change has been for the good, and, if not, what, if 
anything, can be done. It may be, of course, that the Justices will think that this is 
something they cannot do, or that the costs of trying to do it may be too great. They 
are, after all, not each other’s keepers or confidants, but merely partners in an 
“arranged marriage” without the possibility of divorce.298 In such circumstances, 
collegiality is a precious and fragile necessity. It must be preserved if the Court is to 
do its work, and it must not be squandered or compromised needlessly. But that 
response is not entirely persuasive. Whether the current practice of oral argument 
serves its traditional purpose is a question central to the administration of justice and 
one worthy of the Court’s attention. However the Justices may have come to be 
where they are, they are collectively responsible for the performance of the Court on 
which they sit, and for preserving the public’s confidence in it.  
  
                                                            
298 EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 32. 
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